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Abstract
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near
stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale
and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness requires that a matching must be stable
in the classic sense, even if the agents slightly change their preferences. Near stability, on the
other hand, imposes that a matching must become stable (again, in the classic sense) provided
the agents are willing to adjust their preferences a bit. Both of our concepts are quantitative;
together they provide means for a fine-grained analysis of the stability of matchings. Moreover,
our concepts allow the exploration of trade-offs between stability and other criteria of social
optimality, such as the egalitarian cost and the number of unmatched agents. We investigate
the computational complexity of finding matchings that implement certain predefined trade-offs.
We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that, given agent preferences, returns a socially optimal
robust matching, and we prove that finding a socially optimal and nearly stable matching is
computationally hard.
1 Introduction
In the Stable Marriage problem [15] we are given two disjoint sets of agents, U and W . Each
agent from one set has a strict preference list that ranks a subset of the agents from the other set.
The sets of agents and their preference lists are collectively called preference profile. The goal is
to find a matching—i.e., a bijection between U and W—that does not contain a blocking pair , i.e.,
a pair of agents who prefer each other over their matched partners. A matching with no blocking
pairs is called a stable matching .
The classic definition of stability is qualitative: A matching can be either stable or not, and
there are no other states in between or beyond. In this paper, by contrast, we take a quantitative
approach. We propose and study two solution concepts: robustness and near stability , where the
former strengthens and the latter relaxes the notion of stability. Intuitively, a robust matching is
more than stable; it remains stable even if agents change their preferences slightly. In contrast, a
nearly stable matching needs not be stable for the original profile, but it becomes so after some
minor changes in the preferences. Below we give more precise definitions of robust and nearly stable
matchings and motivate their study through a number of observations.
Robust matchings. Our first main observation is that the preference lists provided by the agents
do not always reflect their true preferences. This can happen, for instance, because the agents do not
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have full information about their potential partners, or because formulating accurate preferences is
a hard task that requires substantial cognitive effort [28]. It is also typical that the agents change
their preferences over time, for instance, in response to changes in their operating environment.
Thus, a matching that is stable in the classic sense (with respect to the preferences expressed by the
agents at the beginning) can in fact contain two or more agents who already have or will likely have
incentives to drop their assigned partners and be matched with each other. In other words, there
are situations where the classic definition of stability can turn out to be too weak. In a different
setting, a third party may want to destabilize a matching by bribing certain agents to change their
preferences. In that case, we are interested in stable matchings which defy such attacks.
For the above reasons, we introduce and study d-robustness, a strengthened notion of stability.
A matching is d-robust for a given preference profile if this matching is stable and remains stable
after performing an arbitrary sequence of d swaps. Here, a swap is the reversal of two consecutive
agents in a preference list. Intuitively, if a matching is d-robust for some reasonably large d, then
it will not become unstable even if the agents specified slightly inaccurate preferences, nor will
it become unstable even if the agents change their preferences by a little. Example 1.1 below
illustrates the concept of robustness.
Example 1.1. Consider the profile P below with 4 men and 4 women, where the preference lists
are to the right of the corresponding agents; preferences are represented as horizontal lists where
more preferred agents are put to the left of the less preferred ones.
u1 : w2w3w1w4
u2 : w3w4w2w1
u3 : w4w1w3w2
u4 : w1w2w4w3
w1 : u1u2u3u4
w2 : u2u3u4u1
w3 : u3u4u1u2
w4 : u4u1u2u3
This profile admits five stable matchings:
(1) The U -opt. stable matching M1={{u1, w2}, {u2, w3}, {u3, w4}, {u4, w1}} (red dashed lines),
(2) the W -opt. stable matching M2={{u1, w1}, {u2, w2}, {u3, w3}, {u4, w4}} (black solid lines),
(3) M3 = {{u1, w3}, {u2, w2}, {u3, w1}, {u4, w4}},
(4) M4={{u1, w1}, {u2, w4}, {u3, w3}, {u4, w2}}, and
(5) M5={{u1, w3}, {u2, w4}, {u3, w1}, {u4, w2}}.
In terms of robustness, M2 is superior to M1 since M2 is 1-robust but M1 is not. To see that M2 is
1-robust we observe that, to make M2 unstable, we need to perform one swap in the preference list
of an agent in W . However, no such single swap will make M2 unstable. Stable matching M1 is not
1-robust since one can swap in the preference list of any agent u from U the two agents M1(u) and
w in the first and the second positions to obtain a profile where {u,w} is a blocking pair for M1. 
Nearly stable matchings. Our second main observation is that there exist other factors, apart
from the preferences, that can discourage the agents to break their relations with their matched
partners. Such factors may include social pressure and additional costs incurred by changing the
partner, for example. Thus, in some situations even weaker forms of stability may guarantee a
sufficient level of resilience to agents changing their minds. We express this as the local d-near
stability of a matching, which stipulates that there is a sequence of swaps such that the matching
becomes stable, and in each agent’s preference list, at most d swaps are made.
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This concept has an intuitive interpretation similar to the -Nash-equilibrium [31, Section
2.6.6] in game theory: In a locally d-nearly stable matching no agent can improve its satisfaction
by more than d through rematching (see also the equivalent definitions in Proposition 2.7). This is
analogous to -Nash-equilibria, where no agent can improve their outcome by more than . In this
sense, local near stability also measures the strength of the incentive for two agents in a blocking
pair to change their partners.1
Our third main observation is that, when there are constraints on other factors of the matching
like social welfare (see below), it may not be possible to find a stable matching satisfying these
constraints. Thus, it may be necessary to balance between the social welfare and the costs incurred
by agents that want to switch partners. This cost is captured by the global d-near stability of a
matchingM , stating that there is a sequence of at most d swaps in total such thatM becomes stable.
In order to achieve the desired social welfare, we may thus provide proportionate compensation to
the agents affected by the swaps.
Taking nearly stable matchings into consideration may indeed allow us to find a matching that
is significantly better from the perspective of the society as a whole, than if we restricted ourselves
to stable matchings only. This is illustrated in the following example:
Example 1.2. Let U = {a0, . . . , an−1, x1, . . . , xn} and W = {b0, . . . , bn−1, y1, . . . , yn}, and consider
the following preference profile P of the agents; the index “i+ 1” is taken modulo n.
a0 : b0 b1 b0 : a0 an−1
ai : bi bi+1 bi : ai−1 x1 . . . xn ai (for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}).
xi : yi b1 . . . bn−1 yi : xi (for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}).
In every stable matching of P agent xi must be matched with yi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and a0 with b0.
Consequently, a1 needs to be matched with with b1 and, by an inductive argument, we can infer
that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, ai must be matched with bi. Thus, if we look at the agents from
B = {b1, . . . , bn}, we observe that, except for b0, each of them is matched with a partner ranked at
the (n+2)th position. Yet, if we consider the profile obtained from P by swapping a0 and an−1 in the
preference list of b0, then M = {{a0, b1}, {a1, b2}, . . . , {an−1, b0}} ∪ {{xi, yi} | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} would be
a stable matching. In this matching everyone is matched to one of her two most preferred agents. 
Intuitively, Example 1.2 shows that with a relatively small loss of stability, one can significantly
improve the social cost of a matching M—in this example, this cost is defined as the sum of ranks
that an agent a has in the preference list of its matched partner M(a). In the literature this measure
is often referred to as the egalitarian cost of a matching [20]. We also consider another metric that
counts the number of agents that are assigned a partner in a matching. Recall that we assume
that the preference rankings of the agents are incomplete: the agents do not rank those from the
opposite set that they would not agree to be matched to. In such a case a stable matching does
not need to be perfect, i.e., it is possible that some agents will not be matched at all. The effect of
stability on the number of matched agents is illustrated in Example 1.3.
Example 1.3. Consider a profile with 2 men, a1 and a2, and 2 women, b1 and b2, with preference
lists: a1 : b1; b1 : a2 a1; a2 : b1 b2; b2 : a2. For this profile, the only stable matching is {{a2, b1}}.
However, if we swapped b1 and b2 in the preference list of a2, then {{a1, b1}, {a2, b2}} would be a
stable matching, i.e., we would obtain a stable matching where more agents have partners. 
1There are some differences between the two concepts since we deal with ordinal preferences. Yet, our concepts
generalize to cardinal utilities, where the similarities are more transparent.
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Table 1: Summary of our results, where d denotes the number of swaps for robust matchings, dL
(resp. dG) denotes the number of swaps for global near stability (resp. local near stability), η denotes
the egalitarian cost of the desired matching, and nu denotes the number of unmatched agents in
any stable matching of the initial profile without ties.
Social Robust Robust Globally Nearly Stable Locally Nearly Stable
criteria (without ties) (with ties) (without ties) (without ties)
No further P NP-h (d = 1) Always exists even for dG = dL = 0
restrictions [Thm 3.21] [Thm 4.1] and can be found in O(n2) time [15, 18]
Perfect P NP-h (d = 0) XP for dG, W[1]-h for nu [Cor 5.6] NP-h (dL = 1) [Thm 5.3], W[1]-h for nu [Cor 5.6]
matching [Thm 3.24] [25] No poly-approximation [Thm 5.3] No poly-approximation [Thm 5.3]
Egalitarian P NP-c (d = 0) XP for dG, W[1]-h for nu NP-h (dL = 1) [Thm 5.3], W[1]-h for nu
cost η [Thm 3.24] [25] No poly-approximation [Thm 5.3] No poly-approximation [Thm 5.3]
Examples 1.2 and 1.3 suggest that there is a (possibly non-linear) trade-off between stability and
other criteria of social optimality. Our definition of near stability provides a formalism necessary
to describe the trade-offs; yet, in order to take advantage of them, one needs to be able to identify
situations where a large improvement of social welfare is possible with a relatively small sacrifice
of stability. We formalize this question as a computational problem (see Section 2.1 for formal
definitions) and study its complexity.
Our contributions. We introduce the concepts of robustness and near stability, and explore
the trade-off between stability and the egalitarian cost and between stability and the number of
matched agents. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a preference profile and a
number d, finds a matching which is d-robust if it exists (Theorem 3.21). We achieve this by
providing a polynomial-size characterization of the profiles (Section 3.2) which are close to the
input profile and by heavily exploiting the structural properties of so-called rotations adherent to
a preference profile [18]. Moreover, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a d-robust
matching with minimum egalitarian cost if one exists (Theorem 3.24). However, when ties are
present, we show that finding a robust matching is NP-hard (Theorem 4.1).
In contrast to the polynomial-time algorithms for robust matchings, we show that the problem of
finding a matching that implements a certain trade-off between the near stability and the egalitarian
cost, or between the near stability and the perfectness of the matching is NP-hard, and it is
NP-hard to approximate (Theorem 5.3). Motivated by this general hardness result, we study
the parameterized complexity, mainly with respect to the parameter number of allowed swaps
(for details on parameterized complexity we refer to the books of Cygan et al. [10], Downey and
Fellows [11], Flum and Grohe [14], and Niedermeier [30]). See Table 1 for a summary. Unfortunately,
we mostly obtain further hardness results. While for local near stability even only one allowed swap
leaves the problem NP-hard (Theorem 5.3), for global near stability there is a polynomial-time
algorithm for each constant number dG of allowed swaps (Proposition 5.4). The exponent in the
running time depends on dG, however, and this dependency cannot be removed unless the unlikely
complexity-theoretic collapse FPT = W[1] happens (Theorem 5.5). We also study the complexity
in the cases where there are small numbers of unmatched or matched agents in a classically stable
matching of the input profile.
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Related work. For an overview on the Stable Marriage and related problems, we refer to
the books of Knuth [22], Gusfield and Irving [18], and Manlove [26].
First, we review work related to our concept of robustness. As we mentioned in the beginning of
this section, one of the observations that motivates our study of robust matchings is that the pref-
erences of the agents may be uncertain. In this regard, Aziz et al. [2], Miyazaki and Okamoto [29],
and Chen et al. [9] study a variant of Stable Marriage where there is a collection of “possible”
preference profiles given as input, and they look for a matching that is stable in each of the given
profiles (the corresponding computational problem is NP-hard even for constant number of input
profiles). Our work starts with the assumption that the preferences provided by the agents are a
good approximation of their true preferences. Thus, our robustness concept respects every profile
that is close to the preferences provided by the agents. This makes a crucial difference—finding a
robust matching if one exists, according to our definition, is solvable in polynomial time.
Our robustness concept is related to the works of Mai and Vazirani [23, 24]. They introduced
a probabilistic model, where there are polynomially many preference profiles given in the input,
each differing from the original one by a single agent’s preference list. While they do not assume
this difference to be small, they assume there is a probabilistic distribution over these polynomially
many preference profiles, and the goal is to find a stable matching that stays stable with the highest
probability. In contrast, in our definition of robustness, we require that the sought matching must be
stable in every profile which is close to the original one, but which can differ from the original profile
in preference lists by more than one agent. Furthermore, we do not assume that the distribution of
the profiles is given, but rather infer the “relevant” (close) profiles directly from the original profile.
Our approach, based on the concept of distances, induces a quantitative measure of the strength
of stability; we further extend it in the converse direction by considering matchings that are nearly
stable, getting a full set of tools that allow to reason about the strength of stability for any matching.
Mai and Vazirani [23, 24] proved that a matching that stays stable with the largest probability
for a given probability distribution can be found in polynomial time as long as only a single agent
changes her preferences in each profile. Their techniques crucially rely on the fact that, for each
of the preference profiles P ′ that has nonzero probability, the set of matchings that are stable for
both P ′ and the input profile P has a certain type of sublattice structure of the lattice of stable
matchings of P . In our model, this is not the case; the set of stable matchings for the preference
profiles obtained by d arbitrary swaps may not be a sublattice anymore. Thus, this approach is
not directly applicable in our scenario. Moreover, in the general case, where we allow arbitrary
changes between profiles, it is impossible to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm unless P = NP:
Miyazaki and Okamoto [29] and Chen et al. [9] showed that finding a matching which is stable for
even only two profiles is NP-hard. Nevertheless, we provide a compact characterization of all close
profiles, based on which, and partly inspired by the techniques of Mai and Vazirani [23], we provide
a polynomial-time algorithm for our robustness model. In this regard, our algorithmic techniques
can be considered as a generalization of the ones by Mai and Vazirani [23].
Finally, let us mention a relation between robustness and strategy-proofness. We say that a
matching algorithm is strategy-proof (see [18, Chapter 4], [33, Chapter 1.7], [26, Chapter 2.9])
if no agent can obtain a better partner by misreporting her preferences; it is known that there
exists no strategy-proof matching mechanism. Robustness implies a very weak form of strategy-
proofness, where the set of agents’ strategies is limited—the agents are willing to report only those
rankings that are not significantly different from their true preferences. Even more closely related,
robustness implies resilience to certain forms of bribery—the problem of bribery, originally defined
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for single-winner elections [13], can be naturally adapted to matchings.
Now we turn to work that is more related to our near stability concept. Another interpretation
of a locally d-nearly stable matching is that in each blocking pair there is an agent whose rank
improvement by switching partners would be at most d. Drummond and Boutilier [12] use this rank
improvement approach to study Stable Marriage problem under partially ordered preferences.
They introduced the notion of an r-maximally stable matching, i.e., a matching such that for each
linear completion of the input profile and for each unmatched pair at least one agent in the pair ranks
the other higher than its matched partner by at most r positions. When restricting the input to
linear preferences, as is our focus here, r-maximal stability is equivalent to local r-near stability for
each r ≥ 0. We prove this formally in Proposition 2.7. Here, in contrast, we do not deal with partial
preferences, but instead we want to achieve a given social welfare in addition to r-maximal stability.
Pini et al. [32] and Anshelevich et al. [1] studied a concept called (additive) α-stability that mea-
sures the degree of instability for utility-based preferences. For ordinal preferences, their concept
is equivalent to our local α-near stability. Anshelevich et al. [1] studied the trade-off between the
total utility of a matching and its α-stability for restricted structures of utility scores (which cannot
model ordinal preferences). Pini et al. [32] showed that a certain kind of lexicographically optimal
α-stable matching can be found in polynomial time and they considered manipulation issues.
Finally, we review further related work, not necessarily directly related to our notions of
robustness or near stability. Recently, Menon and Larson [27] proposed a different robustness
concept to deal with uncertain preferences–the authors assume that each agent has preferences
with ties on the agents of the opposite set and look for a perfect matching so as to minimize
the maximum number of blocking pairs among all linear extensions of the input preferences. In
contrast to our approach, however, these blocking pairs may represent an arbitrarily large rank
improvement, i.e. an arbitrarily large number of swaps needed to make the matching stable.
Finding a solution as above is equivalent to finding a perfect matching with minimum number of
so-called super-blocking pairs, a concept introduced by Irving [19] to cope with preferences with ties,
i.e. weak orders (also see [18]). Menon and Larson [27] mainly obtained inapproximability results.
Genc et al. [16, 17] provide yet another view on robustness in the context of stable matchings.
They define an (x, y)-supermatch as a stable matching that satisfies the following property: If any
x agents break up, it is possible to rematch these x agents so that the new matching is again
stable; further, this re-matching must be done by breaking at most y other pairs. Hence, an
(x, y)-supermatch may not be robust in our sense, but it needs to be easy to repair.
In the second part of this paper we study trade-offs between the stability (of various strength)
and other criteria of optimality such as the egalitarian cost and the number of unmatched agents.
This is related to the studies on the price of stability in matching markets [4]. Concepts similar
to our robustness have been also studied in other contexts, for instance for single-winner [34] and
multi-winner elections [6].
2 Basic Definitions, Notations, and Our Stability Concepts
For each natural number t by [t] we denote the set {1, 2, . . . , t}. Let U = {u1, . . . , un}
and W = {w1, . . . , wn} be two n-element disjoint sets of agents. A preference pro-
file P = ((Pu )u∈U , (Pw)w∈W ) is a collection of the preference lists of the agents from U
and W . Here, for each agent u ∈ U , the notation Pu denotes a linear order on a subset W ′ of W
that represents the ranking of agent u over all agents from W ′ in profile P . The agents in W ′
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are also called acceptable to u. The candidates not ranked by u are those in W \ W ′, that is,
those that u does not agree to be matched to; we also call them unacceptable. If w Pu w′ then
we say that w is preferred to w′ by u in P . Analogously, for each agent w ∈ W , w represents a
linear order on (a subset of) U that represents the ranking of w in profile P and we likewise use
the notions of preference list, preferred, (un-)acceptable, and (not) ranked. We say that P has
complete preferences if each agent finds all agents from the opposite set acceptable.
Given an agent x with her preference list x and given an agent y from the opposite set, the
rank rkx(y,x) of y in the preference list of x is equal to the number of agents that are preferred
to y by x. If y is not acceptable to x then we let rkx(y,x) be equal to the number of agents
acceptable to x. We usually omit the symbol x in rkx(y,x) and write only rkx(y) whenever
the preference list of x is clear from the context. For instance, the rank of y3 in the preference
list x : y1  y3  y2 is one. We say that x ranks y higher than z, if rkx(y) < rkx(z).
Throughout, except in Section 4, by “x  y” for two agents x and y we mean “x = y or x  y”.
Blocking pairs and stable matchings. Given two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , a match-
ing M is a set of pairwise disjoint pairs, each pair containing one agent from U and one agent from
W , i.e. M ⊆ {{u,w} | u ∈ U ∧ w ∈ W} and for each two pairs p, p′ ∈ M it holds that p ∩ p′ = ∅.
Given a pair {u,w} with u ∈ U and w ∈ W , if it holds that {u,w} ∈ M , then we use M(u) to
refer to w and M(w) to refer to u, and we say that u and w are their respective partners under M ;
otherwise we say that {u,w} is an unmatched pair . We say that {u,w} is blocking (or a blocking
pair of ) M if both u and w would prefer to be matched together than to stay with their current
partners. Formally, {u,w} is a blocking pair if the following holds: (1) u and w find each other
acceptable but are not matched together, (2) u is either unmatched by M or rku(w) < rku(M(u)),
and (3) w is either unmatched by M or rkw(u) < rkw(M(w)). We say that a matching M is stable if
no unmatched pair forms a blocking pair for M . Example 1.1 in the introduction illustrates stable
matchings.
We use SM(P ) to denote the set of all stable matchings for a preference profile P . Given a
matching M , we use BP(P,M) to denote the set of all unmatched pairs that are blocking M in
profile P . Obviously, for each stable matching M ∈ SM(P ), it holds that BP(P,M) = ∅.
2.1 Our Spectrum of Stability Notions and Problems
Let us now define our concepts of robustness and near stability, informally introduced in Section 1.
First of all, we need the notion of swaps, which describes the operation of taking two consecutive
agents x and y in a preference list of a third agent z and switching their relative order in order to
obtain a new preference list. We also use (z, {x, y}) to denote such a swap. Given two preference
lists  and ′, the swap distance (also known as the Kendall τ distance [21]) between  and ′
is defined as the number of differently ordered pairs in the two lists; if the two lists are defined on
two different acceptable sets, then the swap distance is infinity. Intuitively, the swap distance is
equal to the minimum number of swaps that are required to turn  into ′. Accordingly, the swap
distance between two preference profiles P1 and P2, denoted as τ(P1, P2), is defined as the sum of
swap distances between the two preference lists of each agent in profiles P1 and P2.
Definition 2.1 (Robustness). For a given preference profile P , we say that a matching M is
d-robust if for each profile P ′ with τ(P, P ′) ≤ d it holds that M is stable in P ′.
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Note that our robustness concept is monotone–each d-robust matching is also d′-robust for
0 ≤ d′ ≤ d. We are interested in the computational question of finding the maximal integer d such
that there is a d-robust matching. This can be phrased as a decision problem as follows:
Robust Matching
Input: A preference profile P with agent sets U and W of size n each, and an integer d ∈ N.
Question: Is there a d-robust matching for P?
Now, we define near stability. Here, we provide two definitions—global near stability and local
near stability—that differ in the scope of admissible changes to the original preference profile.
Definition 2.2 (Near stability). For a given preference profile P , we say that a matching M is
globally d-nearly stable if there exists a profile P ′ with τ(P, P ′) ≤ d such that M is stable in P ′.
We say that M is locally d-nearly stable if there exists a profile P ′ with τ(Px ,P
′
x ) ≤ d for each
agent x ∈ U ∪W such that M is stable in P ′.
Since near stability is a more permissive concept than stability as defined by Gale and
Shapley [15], it is straight-forward that a globally d-nearly stable (or locally d-nearly stable)
matching always exists for d ≥ 0. Here, our main focus is to explore the trade-offs between the
strength of stability and other criteria of social optimality. We say that a matching M is perfect
if each agent has a partner in M . The egalitarian cost of M in a profile P = (x)x∈U∪W is
η(M) :=
∑
x∈U∪W rkx(M(x),x). This leads to the following computational problems, abbreviated
as Global-Near+Egal, and Local-Near+Egal.
Globally (or Locally) Nearly Stable Perfect Matching
Input: A preference profile P with agent sets U and W of size n each, and an integer d ∈ N.
Question: Is there a globally d-nearly stable (or locally d-nearly stable) stable matching for P
which is perfect?
Globally (or Locally) Nearly Stable Egalitarian Matching
Input: A preference profile P with agent sets U and W of size n each, and two integers d, η ∈ N.
Question: Is there a globally d-nearly stable (or locally d-nearly stable) stable matching for P
which has egalitarian cost at most η in P?
For preferences without ties (i.e. every agent has a strict preference list), we will use the following
fundamental result from the literature.
Proposition 2.3 ([18, Theorem 1.4.2]). For incomplete preferences without ties, the agent set
can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets R and S such that every stable matching matches
every agent from R and none of the agents from S. For agent set of size 2n, this partition can be
computed in O(n2) time.
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2.2 Structural Properties of Robust and Nearly Stable Matchings
Before we proceed further, we provide some structural results concerning Definitions 2.1 and 2.2.
First we give two observations regarding robustness. These are not necessary for the considerations
about algorithms later on, but serve to strengthen the intuition about profiles that allow for robust
matchings and, we feel, are interesting in their own right. Further below, we consider the trade-off
between near stability and perfectness of matchings and give alternative characterizations of locally
nearly stable matchings.
Proposition 2.4. If d ≥ n and there exists one agent who finds at least two other agents acceptable,
then no stable matching is d-robust.
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary stable matching. To show that no stable matching is d-robust, it
suffices to show that performing at most n swaps can make an unmatched pair a blocking pair of M .
To this end, let x be an agent who finds at least two other agents acceptable. Further, let y be an
acceptable agent of x, satisfying the following. If x is unmatched under M or if rkx(M(x)) ≥ 1, then
y is the most preferred agent of x (that is, rkx(y) = 0); otherwise, y is the second-most preferred
agent of x (that is, rkx(y) = 1). Now, use at most one swap to make agent y the most preferred
agent of x, and at most n− 1 swaps to make agent x the most preferred agent of y. This results in
{x, y} being a blocking pair of M . Hence, M is not d-robust, as d ≥ n.
A matching is top-choice if each agent is matched to her most preferred partner. A profile is
position-wise distinct if there are no two agents that have the same agent in the same position in
their preference lists.
Proposition 2.5. Every (n − 1)-robust matching is top-choice and every profile allowing for an
(n− 1)-robust matching is position-wise distinct.
Proof. Let P be a preference profile on two n-element sets U and W , and let M be an (n − 1)-
robust matching. We first show that M is top-choice. This is clear if each agent finds only one
other agent acceptable. Otherwise, there is at least one unmatched pair of agents. Observe that
for each unmatched pair {x, y} of agents it must hold that
rkx(y) + rky(x) ≥ n (1)
as otherwise we can perform at most n − 1 swaps, rkx(y) swaps in x’s preference list and rky(x)
swaps in y’s preference list, to make x and y be each other’s most preferred agent. This results in
{x, y} being a blocking pair of M—a contradiction to M being (n− 1)-robust.
To show that M is top-choice, towards a contradiction, suppose that M is not top-choice. This
means that there exists an unmatched pair {x, y} such that y is the most preferred agent of x, i.e.
rkx(y) = 0. However, by (1), it implies that rky(x) ≥ n—a contradiction to the fact that the rank
of an agent is at most n− 1.
It remains to prove that P is position-wise distinct. We first consider the case when n = 2
and then the case when n ≥ 3; the case with n = 1 is trivial. Assume that n = 2. Since M is
top-choice, we infer that the most preferred agents of two different agents are different from each
other. Now suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there are three distinct agents x1, x2, y
such that rkx1(y) = 1 and rkx2(y) = 1. By (1), we must have that rky(x1) ≥ n − 1 = 1 and
rky(x2) ≥ n − 1 = 1. Hence, rky(x1) = rky(x2) = 1 as each rank is at most n − 1 = 1, this is a
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contradiction to the fact that no two agents have the same rank by the same agent. This finishes
the proof for the case when n = 2.
In the remainder of the proof, we assume that n ≥ 3. Before proving that P is position-wise
distinct in this case as well, we observe that each agent finds all other agents acceptable.
Let u and w be two unmatched agents such that rku(w) = 1. By (1), we have rkw(u) ≥ n − 1
and indeed rkw(u) = n− 1 since n− 1 is the largest-possible rank. This implies that w appears in
the preference list of every agent from U . By the top-choice property of M , we infer that, except
for the partner M(w) of w, every agent x from U \ {M(w)} finds at least two agents acceptable:
her partner M(x) and agent w. We claim that indeed M(w) also finds at least two other agents
acceptable. Since n ≥ 3, there is a third agent u′ ∈ U \{M(w), u} who finds w acceptable. Let w′ ∈
W be an agent with rku′(w
′) = 1. Again by (1), this implies that rkw′(u′) = n−1. Hence, w′ also has
complete preferences and finds M(w) acceptable, implying that M(w) finds w′ acceptable. Since
u 6= u′ and rkw(u) = n− 1, we infer that w′ 6= w because rkw′(u′) = n− 1. This implies that M(w)
also finds at least two agents acceptable, namely w and w′. Since no two agents can have rank n−1
in the same preference list it must hold that the second-most preferred agents of all agents from U
are different from each other. Thus, using (1), each agent w ∈W must have complete preferences.
By the symmetry of acceptability, each agent u ∈ U must also have complete preferences.
We are now ready to prove that P is position-wise distinct when n ≥ 3. This is clear if each
agent finds only one other agent acceptable. Otherwise, there exists at least one unmatched pair
of agents. We will show the stronger statement that, for each unmatched pair {u,w}, with u ∈ U
and w ∈W and for each z ∈ [n− 1] it holds that
rku(w) = z if and only if rkw(u) = n− z. (2)
(Note that we can replace “if and only if” by “only if” to obtain an equivalent statement, but the
former is more convenient when we prove it by induction below.) To see that (2) implies that P
is top-choice, suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there are three distinct agents x1, x2, y
and an integer z such that rkx1(y) = rkx2(y) = z. Since M is top-choice, z > 0. Clearly, z ≤ n− 1.
Thus, by (2) rky(x1) = rky(x2) = n− z, a contradiction.
We show (2) via induction on the rank index z := rku(w), starting with the base case z = 1.
To this end, let {u,w} be an unmatched pair. To show the “only if” part of (2), assume that
z = rku(w) = 1. By (1), it follows that rkw(u) ≥ n − 1. Since the rank of each agent is at most
n− 1, it follows that rkw(u) = n− 1 = n− z.
For the “if” part of the base case suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is an unmatched
pair {u,w} with rkw(u) = n − 1 but rku(w) 6= 1. By (1), it follows that rku(w) > 1. Since each
agent has complete preferences, by the above reasoning, there exists an other agent u′ ∈ U \ {u}
with rku′(w) = 1. However, then by the “if” part of the base case, it follows that rkw(u
′) = n−1—a
contradiction. Thus, (2) holds when z = 1.
For the induction assumption, assume that (2) holds for every index z′ ≤ z − 1. For the “only
if” part, consider an unmatched pair {u,w} with rku(w) = z. By (1), it follows that rkw(u) ≥ n−z.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that rkw(u) = n − z′ with z′ < z. By the “if” part of the
induction assumption, we infer that rku(w) = z
′ < z—a contradiction.
The “if” part of the induction step follows analogously.
Now we discuss the trade-offs formalized in the problems regarding near stability and social
optimality. As mentioned in Example 1.2 even a single swap in the preference profile can improve
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the egalitarian cost of the stable matching by Ω(n2). However, this is not the case when the social
optimality is measured by the number of agents who will have a partner in the matching.
Theorem 2.6. Let P1 and P2 be two preference profiles with τ(P1, P2) = 1. Let S1 and S2 denote
the set of agents that are unmatched by any stable matching of P1 and of P2 respectively. Then,
|(S1 \ S2) ∪ (S2 \ S1)| ≤ 2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that profile P2 is obtained from P1 by swapping agents
w1 and w2 in the preference list of agent u1 so that u1 prefers w1 to w2 in P1 and w2 to w1 in P2.
By Proposition 2.3, in order to show the statement, it suffices to show that P1 and P2 admit
stable matchings M1 and M2, respectively, such that the following is satisfied. Let S1 and S denote
the set of agents that is unmatched under M1 and M2, respectively. Then, |(S1\S2)∪(S2\S1)| ≥ 2.
To achieve this, we start with an arbitrary but fixed stable matching, M1, of P1. And we will
show how to modify M1 to obtain a stable matching of P2 such that the set of unmatched agents
differ by at most two agents.
Observe that if M1 would not be stable for profile P2 anymore, then {u1, w2} is the only possible
blocking pair because P1 and P2 differ only by one single swap of the preference list of agent u1. If
M1 is not stable for P2, then we modify M1 in the following way. We break the pairs {u1,M1(u1)}
and {M1(w2), w2} (if they exist) and we replace them with {u1, w2}. Now, there are two new
unmatched agents: M1(w2) ∈ U and M1(u1) ∈ W . Further, if we remove these agents from the
consideration, the matching would be stable.
We now proceed as follows. We will perform a sequence of changes to M1. After each change we
will keep in the penalty box at most two unmatched agents, one from U and one from W , starting
with M1(w2) and M1(u1). Further, each change will keep satisfying the following invariant: if we
remove the agents contained in the penalty box, then the resulting matching would be stable. Let
us now describe the way in which we perform the changes. Let M be the matching at the current
iteration. We take out an agent u ∈ U from the penalty box (if such an agent does not exist, we
stop). Agent u might be involved in a number of blocking pairs—if it does not, we stop. We take
u’s most preferred agent w ∈W such that {u,w} is a blocking pair of the current matching M—we
remove {M(w), w} from the matching M and replace it with {u,w}. Finally, we add M(w) to
the penalty box. Clearly, u cannot be involved in any blocking pair, thus, any blocking pair must
involve an agent from the penalty box; hence the invariant is indeed satisfied.
Each such a change replaces a U -agent from the penalty box with another U -agent. Further
each change improves one of the W -agents by giving her a more preferred partner. Thus, our
procedure must stop at some point. When this is the case we remove the U -agent from the penalty
box. Then, we perform an analogous procedure but each time replacing a W -agent in the penalty
box with another W -agent. By an analogous arguments, such changes keep the invariant satisfied
and the procedure finally stops.
Clearly, when the procedure stops, there are no blocking pairs. Further, the resulting matching
has at most two more agents without partners than M1.
Repeated application of Theorem 2.6 yields that, in order to increase the number of matched
agents by ` ∈ N in a given stable matching of some profile we have to allow for at least `/2 swaps.
In other words, if a stable matching leaves s agents unmatched, then there is a globally d-nearly
stable perfect matching only if d ≥ s/2.
Let us recall the notion of r-maximal stability for the case with linear orders [12]: A matching M
is r-maximally stable if for each unmatched pair {u, v} /∈ M , it holds that min{rku(M(u)) −
11
rku(v), rkv(M(v)) − rkv(u)} ≤ r. At the first glance, this notion looks quite different from local
d-near stability; we show below that in fact they are equivalent. Moreover, local dL-near stability
is equivalent to the following measure of the weight of a blocking pair. We say that a matching M
is dL-nearly bp stable if for each blocking pair b ∈ BP(P,M), there exists a profile P ′b such that
b /∈ BP(P ′b,M) and τ(P, P ′b) ≤ dL.
Proposition 2.7. Let P be a preference profile without ties, M be a matching for P , and dL a
nonnegative integer. The following are equivalent. (i) M is dL-maximally stable. (ii) M is locally
dL-nearly stable. (iii) M is dL-nearly bp stable.
Proof. (i)⇒ (ii): Construct a directed graph G on the set V of agents as follows. For each blocking
pair {u, v} ∈ BP(P,M) find the agent, say u, such that rku(M(u)) − rku(v) ≤ rkv(M(v)) − rkv(u)
and add the arc (v, u) to G (that is, add an arc directed towards u).
To obtain a modified profile P ′ in which M is stable, define, for each agent u, a set of swaps in
u’s preference list as follows. Let Bu be the set of agents v, such that (v, u) is an arc in G. Pick
w = argminv∈Bu rku(v). Observe that rku(M(u))− rku(w) ≤ d since (w, u) is an arc in G and since
M is dL-maximally stable. Swap M(u) in u’s preference list with the agent directly preceding M(u)
until M(u) P ′u w in the resulting profile P ′. In this way, for each agent we have made at most dL
swaps to obtain P ′.
Note that throughout the swapping process no new blocking pairs are introduced, that is,
BP(P ′,M) ⊆ BP(P,M), because in each step only a matched agent improves her rank in its
matched partner’s preference list. Moreover, for each blocking pair {u, v} ∈ BP(P,M), we have
either M(u) ≺P ′u v or M(v) ≺P
′
v u by construction. Thus, M is stable with respect to P
′, showing
that M is locally dL-nearly stable.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Let P ′ be a profile as promised by local dL-near stability. For each blocking
pair {u, v} ∈ BP(P,M) either M(v) has been swapped before u in v’s preference list or M(u) has
been swapped before v in u’s preference list using in either case at most d swaps. Restricting P ′ to
only these swaps yields a profile P ′{u,v} as required by dL-nearly bp stable.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Let {u, v} be an unmatched pair under M . If {u, v} /∈ BP(P,M), then
min{rku(M(u)) − rku(v), rkv(M(v)) − rkv(u)} ≤ 0 ≤ dL. Otherwise, {u, v} ∈ BP(P,M). By
dL-nearly bp stability, there are dL swaps such that in the resulting profile P
′ we have M(u) P ′u v
or M(v) P ′v u because {u, v} /∈ BP(P ′,M). Since {u, v} ∈ BP(P,M), meaning that both
v Pu M(u) and u Pv M(v) hold, and since τ(P, P ′) ≤ dL, we have rku(M(u)) − rku(v) ≤ dL
or rkv(M(v))− rkv(u) ≤ dL. In other words, M is dL-maximally stable.
3 A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Finding Robust Matchings
In this section we present a polynomial-time algorithm for the Robust Matching problem. First,
in Section 3.1 we provide a brief overview of tools and results from the literature that we will use
in our algorithm. We remark that all these results are originally stated for complete preferences.
Nevertheless, since all stable matchings match the same set of agents (Proposition 2.3), we can
verify that they also hold when the preferences may be incomplete. The results described in the
subsequent sections, starting from Section 3.2, are our original contributions.
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3.1 Preliminaries
Recall that a pair {u,w} with u ∈ U and w ∈ W is a stable pair of a preference profile P if it is
contained in at least one stable matching of P .
Proposition 3.1 ([18, Theorem 3.4.3]). For each preference profile, after O(n4) preprocessing time,
determining whether a given set Q of t pairs is a stable set of P can be done in O(t2) time.
As already observed in the literature, the set of all stable matchings for a given preference
profile forms a lattice–a specific partially ordered set–that is useful in designing algorithms for
finding special kinds of stable matchings. The maximum and minimum elements are so-called
optimal stable matchings: Consider a preference profile P with two sets, U and W , of agents and
consider two matchings M and M ′. We say that an agent a ∈ U ∪W prefers M to M ′, denoted
as M a M ′, if rka(M(a)) < rka(M ′(a)). Similarly, agent a weakly prefers M to M ′, denoted as
M a M ′, if M(a) = M ′(a) or rka(M(a)) < rka(M ′(a)). Accordingly, we say that M is a U -optimal
(resp. W -optimal) stable matching if it is stable and there is no other stable matching M ′ different
from M such that each agent from U prefers M ′ to M .
It is well-known that U -optimal and W -optimal stable matchings are unique. The concepts of
U -optimal and W -optimal stable matchings are already illustrated in Example 1.1.
Proposition 3.2 below shows that, when comparing two stable matchings, an improvement of
an agent u ∈ U always comes at the cost of some other agent from W .
Proposition 3.2 ([18, Theorem 1.3.1, Chapter 1.4.2]). Let M1 and M2 be two stable matchings of
the same preference profile with (possibly) incomplete preferences, and let u and w be two agents
such that M1(u) = w but M2(u) 6= w. Then, M1 u M2 if and only if M2 w M1.
Finally, we recall that the famous Gale/Shapley algorithm always finds the U -optimal (or,
depending on the variant of the algorithm used, the W -optimal) stable matching.
Proposition 3.3 ([15],[18, Chapter 1.4.2]). The U -optimal and the W -optimal stable matchings of
a preference profile always exist and can be found in O(n2) time.
We now review a fundamental object, rotations, and some well-known structural properties of
stable matchings. These concepts will play an instrumental role in our analysis in the subsequent
sections. For more details, we refer to the exposition by Gusfield and Irving [18].
Definition 3.4 (Successor agent, rotations, and rotation elimination). Let P be a preference profile
with two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , and with (possibly) incomplete preferences. Given a stable
matching M ∈ SM(P ), for each agent u ∈ U , we define its successor succM (u) as the first (after
M(u)) agent w on the preference list of u such that w is matched under M and prefers u to its
partner M(w). We illustrate the concept of the successor below:
u : . . .M(u) . . . succM (u) . . . succM (u) : . . . u . . .M(succM (u)) . . .
A sequence ρ = ((u0, w0), (u1, w1), . . . , (ur−1, wr−1)) of pairs is called a rotation if there exists a
stable matching M ∈ SM(P ) such that for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} we have (ui, wi) ∈ U ×W ,
M(ui) = wi, and succM (ui) = wi+1 (index i+1 taken modulo r). We say rotation ρ is exposed in M .
We use the notation M/ρ to refer to the matching resulting from M by replacing each
pair {ui, wi} with {ui, wi+1}. Formally,
M/ρ = M \ {{ui, wi} | 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1} ∪ {{ui, wi+1} | 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}.
The transformation of M to M/ρ is called the elimination of ρ from M .
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Eliminating a rotation from a stable matching results in another stable matching [18]. The
concepts from Definition 3.4 are illustrated in the example below.
Example 3.5. Consider the profile in Example 1.1. Relative to M1, agent w2 is the first agent
among all agents in the preference list of u1 that prefer u1 to their respective partners. Thus,
succM1(u1) = w2. Sequence ((u1, w2), (u2, w3), (u3, w4), (u4, w1)) is the only rotation exposed
in M1. 
Interestingly, while a given profile with O(n) agents may admit exponentially (O(n!)) many
different stable matchings, the number of rotations is polynomial (O(n2)) [18, Corollary 3.2.1].
Indeed, the set of all rotations gives a compact representation of the set of all possible stable
matchings for a given preference profile. To determine robustness efficiently, we will use this
representation intensely.
The next structural result concerns the properties of a stable matching after eliminating a
rotation ρ.
Proposition 3.6 ([18, Theorem 2.5.6, Lemma 3.2.1, Lemma 3.2.2]). Consider a preference profile
P with two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , and with (possibly) incomplete preferences. For each
two agents u ∈ U and w ∈W , the following holds; recall that x  y means that x = y or x  y.
(i) {u,w} is in a stable matching if and only if either it is in the W -optimal stable matching or
(u,w) belongs to some rotation.
(ii) There is at most one rotation ρ with ρ = ((u0, w0), . . . , (ur−1, wr−1)) such that for some i ∈
{0, . . . , r − 1} it holds that u = ui and wi u w u wi+1.
(iii) There is at most one rotation ρ with ρ = ((u0, w0), . . . , (ur−1, wr−1)) such that for some i ∈
{0, . . . , r − 1} it holds that u = ui and w = wi+1.
(iv) There is at most one rotation ρ with ρ = ((u0, w0), . . . , (ur−1, wr−1)) such that for some i ∈
{0, . . . , r − 1} it holds that w = wi and ui−1 w u w ui.
Now we are ready to introduce the notion of the rotation poset of a given preference profile P . As
we will see later on, each stable matching can be obtained by performing a number of eliminations of
rotations on the U -optimal stable matching. When starting from U some rotations can be exposed
only after some other have been already eliminated. This induces a partial order on rotations and
defines the rotation poset.
Definition 3.7 (Predecessors of rotations, the rotation poset, and the rotation digraph). Let pi
and ρ be two rotations for a preference profile P . We say that pi is a predecessor of ρ, written
as pi BP ρ, if no stable matching in which ρ is exposed can be obtained from the U -optimal stable
matching by a sequence of eliminations of rotations without eliminating pi first. The reflexive closure
of the relation BP , denoted as DP , defines a partial order on the set of all rotations and is called
the rotation poset for P . We abbreviate the name of a subset of the poset that is closed under
predecessors as a closed subset.
An alternative representation of the rotation poset D(P ) is through an acyclic directed graph,
called rotation digraph of P and written as G(P ), whose vertex set is the set of rotations of P , and
there is a direct arc from rotation pi to rotation ρ if and only if pi precedes ρ and there is no other
rotation σ such that pi BP σ BP ρ.
The following example illustrates the rotation poset of profile given in Example 1.1.
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Example 3.8. Let us consider the profile P given in Example 1.1 again. As we mentioned in
Example 3.5, rotation pi1 = ((u1, w2), (u2, w3), (u3, w4), (u4, w1)) is the only rotation exposed in the
U -optimal stable matching M1. After eliminating pi1 from M1, we obtain the stable matching M3 =
M1/pi1. One can also verify that the sequence pi2 = ((u1, w3), (u3, w1)) and pi3 = ((u2, w4), (u4, w2))
are the only two rotations exposed in stable matching M3. After eliminating pi2 from M3, we
obtain the stable matching M4 = M3/pi2. After eliminating pi3 from M3, we obtain the stable
matching M5 = M3/pi3. After eliminating rotation pi3 from M4 or eliminating the rotation pi2
from M5, we obtain the W -optimal stable matching M2.
Since pi1 is only exposed in M1 and
since pi2 and pi3 are only exposed after
the elimination of pi1 we have that pi2 and
pi3 are two (direct) successors of pi1.
The Hasse diagram on the right-hand
side depicts how the stable matchings for
P are related to each other, in terms of
dominance with respect to the satisfac-
tion of the agents from U . Herein, the
matchings are depicted as matrices such
that each pair in a matching is repre-
sented by a column in the corresponding
matrix.
M1 :
(
u1 u2 u3 u4
w2 w3 w4 w1
)
M3 :
(
u1 u2 u3 u4
w3 w4 w1 w2
)
M4 :
(
u1 u2 u3 u4
w1 w4 w3 w2
)
M5 :
(
u1 u2 u3 u4
w3 w2 w1 w4
)
M2 :
(
u1 u2 u3 u4
w1 w2 w3 w4
)
pi1
pi2 pi3
pi3 pi2

Finally, let us describe a central result from the literature that relates rotations and stable pairs.
Proposition 3.9 ([18, Theorem 2.5.7, Lemma 3.3.2]). Let R denote the set of all rotations of a
preference profile P , and let G(P ) denote the rotation digraph of P .
(i) A matching M is a stable matching of P if and only if there is a closed subset of rota-
tions R′ ⊆ R with respect to the precedence relation BP such that M can be generated by
taking the U -optimal stable matching and by eliminating the rotations in R′ in an order con-
sistent with BP .
(ii) The rotation set R and the rotation digraph G(P ) can be computed in O(n2) time.
3.2 Profile Characterization
For a given profile P with O(n) agents and a given swap distance bound d = O(n) there are expo-
nentially many profiles which are within swap distance d to P . In this section, we show that we do
not need to consider all of them in order to find a d-robust matching. Instead, we characterize them
based on pairs of shifts. Briefly put, a shift is a set of swaps which all involve swapping the same
agent forward in a single preference list. We describe a polynomial-size family of “relevant” profiles
and we characterize each of them through a pair of shifts—such a pair of shifts will be represented by
a quadruple of agents. Intuitively, if there exists a profile P ′ witnessing that a certain matching M is
not d-robust, and if P ′ contains more than two shifts with respect to the original profile P , then P ′
can be represented by a number of profiles which satisfy the following. Each of these profiles contains
only two shifts and one of them witnesses that M is not d-robust. Later on, we will show that the
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quadruples which characterize the profiles relevant for checking d-robustness are closely related to
certain rotations—this will give us the tools essential for constructing a polynomial-time algorithm.
Definition 3.10 (Stable quadruples and swap sets). Let P = ((Pu )u∈U , (Pw)w∈W ) be a preference
profile for the two agent sets U and W . A stable quadruple (with respect to P ) is a quadruple
(u∗, w∗, u, w) of four distinct agents with u∗, u ∈ U and w∗, w ∈ W such that there exists a stable
matching for P that contains both {u∗, w} and {u,w∗}.
For each stable quadruple q = (u∗, w∗, u, w) of P , we define the swap set associated with P
and q, denoted as SH(P, q), as the smallest set of swaps which involve the following two kinds of
shifts in the preference lists of u∗ and w∗. 1. The first kind of shifts puts agent w∗ forward until
she is right in front of w in the preference list of u∗, and 2. the second kind of shifts puts agent u∗
forward until she is right in front of u in the preference list of w∗. If w∗ (resp. u∗) is already in
front of w (resp. u), then no swap in the corresponding preference list is needed. Formally,
SH(P, q) :=
⋃
y∈W : wP
u∗yPu∗w∗
{(u∗, {y, w∗})} ∪
⋃
x∈U : uP
w∗xPw∗u∗
{(w∗, {u∗, x})}.
Herein, the notation x  y means either x = y or x  y. Further, let shl(Pu∗ , q) denote the
preference list resulting from starting with Pu∗ and performing the swaps from SH(P, q) that involve
the preference list of u∗. Analogously, let shl(Pw∗ , q) denote the preference list resulting from starting
with Pw∗ and performing the swaps from SH(P, q) that involve the preference list Pw∗. Now, let
P [SH(P, q)] denote the preference profile resulting from P by replacing the preference lists of u∗
and w∗ with shl(Pu∗ , q) and shl(Pw∗ , q), respectively. Formally,
P [SH(P, q)] := ((Px )x∈U\{u∗} + shl(Pu∗ , q), (Py )y∈W\{w∗} + shl(w∗ , q)).
Example 3.11. For an illustration, let us consider the profile given in Example 1.1, denoted as
P = ((Pui)ui∈U , (Pwi)wi∈W ), and the following stable quadruple q = (u3, w2, u4, w1); note that
{{u3, w1}, {u4, w2}} is a stable set (see M3). The swap set SH(P, q) consists of two swaps; both
involve changing u3’s preference list: SH(P, q) = {(u3, {w2, w3}), (u3, {w2, w1})}.
By performing the swaps given in SH(P, q) on Pu3 and on the preference profile, we obtain that
shl(Pu3 , q) = {u3 : w4  w2  w1  w3}, and P [SH(P, q)] = ((Pu1 ,Pu2 ,Pu3 , shl(Pu4 , q)), (pw1 ,Pw2
,Pw3 ,Pw4)). Finally, we observe that in P [SH(P, q)], u4 prefers w1 to w2 and w1 prefers u4 to u3.

A stable quadruple q and the corresponding profile P [SH(P, q)] satisfy the following properties.
Observation 3.12. Let P be a preference profile over the two agent sets U and W , let q be a
stable quadruple with q = (u∗, w∗, u, w) and let Q = P [SH(P, q)] denote the preference profile after
performing the swaps in the set SH(P, q).
(i) Each agent x ∈ U ∪W \ {u∗, w∗} other than u∗ and w∗ has Qx =Px .
(ii) If w∗ Pu∗ w, then Qu∗=Pu∗; otherwise, for each two distinct agents y, z ∈ W \ {w∗} the
following holds. (a) y Qu∗ z iff. y Pu∗ z, (b) y Qu∗ w∗ iff. y Pu∗ w, (c) w∗ Qu∗ y iff. w Pu∗ y.
(iii) If u∗ Pw∗ u, then Qw∗=Pw∗; otherwise, for each two distinct agents y, z ∈ U \ {u∗} the
following holds. (a) y Qw∗ z iff. y Pw∗ z, (b) y Qw∗ u∗ iff. y Pw∗ u, (c) u∗ Qw∗ y iff. u Pw∗ y.
(iv) In P [SH(P, q)], agent u∗ prefers w∗ to w, and agent w∗ prefers u∗ to u.
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Informally, we will argue that, to find a robust matching, it suffices to focus on profiles obtained
by performing swaps induced by certain quadruples. Further, we will show that for each quadruple
q = (u∗, w∗, u, w) in profile P [SH(P, q)] we only need to ensure that {u∗, w∗} is not a blocking pair.
Lemmas 3.13 and 3.14 below formalize our intuition that {u∗, w∗} is the only possible blocking
pair in P [SH(P, q)].
Lemma 3.13. Consider a preference profile P and a stable matching M for P . For a stable
quadruple q = (u∗, w∗, u, w), pair {u∗, w∗} is the only possible blocking pair of M in P [SH(P, q)].
Proof. Let Q = P [SH(P, q)]. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that M admits a blocking
pair {x, y} with x ∈ U and y ∈ W in profile Q and that {x, y} 6= {u∗, w∗}. Since Q differs
from P only in the preference lists of u∗ and w∗ and since M is stable in P , it follows that ei-
ther x = u∗ or y = w∗. If x = u∗, implying that {u∗, y} is blocking M in Q, then it holds that
y Qu∗ M(u∗) and u∗ Qy M(y). However, since {x, y} 6= {u∗, w∗} it follows that y 6= w∗, and that
y Pu∗ M(u∗) (see Observation 3.12(ii)) and u∗ Py M(y) (see Observation 3.12(i)). This implies
that {u∗, y} is also blocking M in P , a contradiction to M being stable in P . Analogously, we can
derive a contradiction for the case of x 6= u∗ and y = w∗.
Lemma 3.14. Let P1 and P2 be two preference profiles for the same two disjoints sets U and
W , and let M ∈ SM(P1) be a stable matching of P1. Let {u∗, w∗} ∈ BP(P2,M) be a blocking
pair for P2 with u
∗ ∈ U and w∗ ∈ W . Define q = (u∗, w∗,M(w∗),M(u∗)). The following holds.
(i) BP(P [SH(P1, q)],M) = {{u∗, w∗}}. (ii) |SH(P1, q)| ≤ τ(P1, P2).
Proof. To show the first statement, assume that M is not stable in P2 and let {u∗, w∗} be a blocking
pair of M for P2. Set Q = P [SH(P1, q)].
By Observation 3.12(iv), we immediately get that {u∗, w∗} is blocking M in profile Q. The fact
that {u∗, w∗} is the only blocking pair follows from Lemma 3.13.
Now let us consider the second statement. By the definition of swap sets on q, we have:
|SH(P1, q)| = max(rku∗(w∗,P1u∗ )−rku∗(M(u∗),P1u∗ ), 0)+max(rkw∗(u∗,P1w∗)−rkw∗(M(w∗),P1w∗), 0).
Since {u∗, w∗} is blocking M in P2 but M is stable for P1, it holds that
w∗ P2u∗ M(u∗) and u∗ P2w∗ M(w∗), while M(u∗) P1u∗ w∗ or M(w∗) P1w∗ u∗.
Thus,
τ(P1, P2) ≥ max(rku∗(w∗,P1u∗ )− rku∗(M(u∗),P1u∗ ), 0) +
+ max(rkw∗(u
∗,P1w∗)− rkw∗(M(w∗),P1w∗), 0)
= |SH(P1, q)|.
proving the statement.
Finally, the following lemma summarizes the informal intuition that we provided so far—it
shows that when searching for a d-robust matching, we only need to focus on some relevant profiles
which are close to the initial one.
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Lemma 3.15. Let P0 be a preference profile for two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , and let
d ∈ N be a non-negative integer. A matching M is d-robust for profile P0 if and only if for each
stable quadruple q = (u∗, w∗, u, w) of P0 such that |SH(P0, q)| ≤ d, matching M is also stable in
P [SH(P0, q)].
Proof. The “only if” direction is straight-forward because M is stable in each profile P with
τ(P0, P ) ≤ d and for each stable quadruple q = (u∗, w∗, u, w) such that |SH(P0, q)| ≤ d, it holds
that τ(P0, P [SH(P0, q)]) = |SH(P0, q)| ≤ d.
For the “if” direction, assume that there is a matching, called M , such that for each stable
quadruple q = (u∗, w∗, u, w) with |SH(P0, q)| ≤ d, matching M is stable in P [SH(P0, q)]. Suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, that there is a preference profile P with τ(P0, P ) ≤ d such that
M is not stable in P . Let {x, y} be a blocking pair of M in P with x ∈ U and y ∈ W . Now
let us consider the quadruple q′ = (x, y,M(y),M(x)). Note that q′ is a stable quadruple with
respect to P0 since M is stable for P0. Since {x, y} ∈ BP(P,M), by Lemma 3.14(i), it follows
that BP(P [SH(P0, q)],M) = {{x, y}} and, by Lemma 3.14(ii), |SH(P0, q)| ≤ τ(P0, P ) ≤ d—a
contradiction to our assumption.
3.3 Relation Between Stable Quadruples and Rotations
Before we state our central results, we need one more element: In this subsection we define
two specific rotations corresponding to a stable quadruple and we investigate their properties
pertaining to robustness. The results stated in this subsection might look quite technical, yet
we deliberately chose these particular formulations as we believe they make the analysis of our
algorithm transparent.
Definition 3.16 (pi(q) and ρ(q) for a stable quadruple q). Let P0 = (P0x )x∈U∪W be a preference
profile with two sets of agents, U and W , and consider a stable quadruple q = (u∗, w∗, u, w).
We use the notation pi(q) to refer to a rotation pi := ((u′0, w′0), . . . , (u′r−1, w′r−1)) with u∗ = u′i
(for some i ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}) that fulfills the following conditions. (i) If w∗ P0u∗ w, then w∗ = w′i
or w′i P0u∗ w∗ P0u∗ w′i+1; (ii) Otherwise, meaning that w P0u∗ w∗, then w = w′i+1.
We use the notation ρ(q) to refer to a rotation ρ := ((u′0, w′0), . . . , (u′r−1, w′r−1)) with w∗ = w′i
(for some i ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}) that fulfills the following conditions. (i) If u∗ P0w∗ u, then u∗ = u′i−1
or u′i−1 P0w∗ u∗ P0w∗ u′i; (ii) Otherwise, meaning that u P0w∗ u∗, then u = u′i.
The below figure illustrates the two specific rotations; recall that for two agents x and y, the
expression “x  y” means that x = y or x  y.
Case (i): u∗ prefers w∗ to w, i.e. w∗ P0u∗ w. Then, u∗ : w′i  w∗  w′i+1.
pi(q)
Case (ii): u∗ prefers w to w∗, i.e. w P0u∗ w∗. Then, u∗ : w′i  w = w′i+1  w∗.
pi(q)
Case (i): w∗ prefers u∗ to u, i.e. u∗ P0w∗ u. Then, w∗ : u′i−1  u∗  u′i.
ρ(q)
Case (ii): w∗ prefers u to u∗, i.e. u P0w∗ u∗. Then, w∗ : u′i−1  u = u′i  u∗.
ρ(q)
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Rotations pi(q) and ρ(q) can be informally described as follows. Consider the preference profile
Q = P [SH(P0, q)]. Rotation pi(q) is the first rotation (according to the precedence relation on
rotations) that moves the partner of u∗ from w∗ or from an agent who is more preferred than w∗
to an agent that is less preferred than w∗, where the preference relation is according to profile Q.
Similarly, rotation ρ(q) is the first rotation that moves the partner of w∗ from an agent who is less
preferred than u∗ to u∗ or to an agent that is more preferred than u∗, where the preference relation
is according to profile Q. However, in Definition 3.16 we deliberately do not refer to profile Q
and define the rotations pi(q) and ρ(q) solely based on P0 in order to make the subsequent formal
analysis and the algorithm as clear as possible.
Roughly speaking, eliminating rotation pi(q) could make a stable matching of the original profile
not stable anymore in the new profile Q—indeed, this is the “first” rotation, elimination of which
causes u∗ to prefer w∗ over its matched partner. In order to make sure that {u∗, w∗} is not blocking
the constructed matching in Q, we need to enforce that, whenever the matching includes pi(q),
agent w∗ must obtain a partner who she prefers over u∗. This is achieved by also including ρ(q)
to the matching. In other words, when selecting rotations which should form a robust matching,
adding ρ(q) fixes some potential issues that arise as a result of adding pi(q) to the matching. This
intuition is formalized in the subsequent lemmas and theorems. While the main idea is intuitive,
the formal analysis is complex since we need to take care of a few technical nuances.
Note that, by our definition, neither pi(q) nor ρ(q) needs to exist. However, if they exist, then
they are unique. We will prove this statement in Lemma 3.18, below. The following example that
illustrates the definitions of pi(q) and ρ(q).
Example 3.17. Recall that in Example 3.8 we have derived the rotation poset of the profile given
in Example 1.1, and q = (u3, w2, u4, w1) is the stable quadruple discussed in Example 3.11.
Since u3 prefers w1 to w2, to define pi(q), we are searching for a rotation, which includes (u3, x)
for some agent x ∈ W such that after the elimination of this rotation, u3 receives agent w1 as a
partner. Rotation pi1 is the only rotation that fulfills this condition. Thus, pi(q) := pi1. Let P
′
be the profile resulting from performing the two swaps given in SH(P, q). One can verify that in
P ′ agent u3 prefers w2 to w1. Thus, in the same profile, either (i) u3 prefers w2 to the partner
assigned by a stable matching whose corresponding closed subset of rotations includes pi(q), or
(ii) the partner of u3 is w
∗ = w2. Indeed, each rotation eliminated, for which rotation pi(q) is a
predecessor, either makes w2 still the partner of u3 or changes the partner of u3 to one which is
less preferred than w1 in the initial profile, including agent w
∗ which is more preferred than w1 in
P ′. This means that such kind of stable matching may be blocked by {u3, w2} in P ′.
As for ρ(q), since w2 prefers u3 to u4, we are searching for a rotation which includes (y, w2)
such that
either y = u3, (3)
or w2 prefers u3 over y and will obtain a partner which w2 prefers over y. (4)
Indeed, since pi3 satisfies (4), one can verify that ρ(q) = pi3. As a final remark, note that, since pi3
satisfies (4), by Gusfield and Irving [18, Lemma 2.5.1] it follows that no stable matching matches
u3 to w2.
Observe that, after the elimination of this rotation, w2 obtains u2, which is her most preferred
agent, i.e., an agent that is strictly better than u3. Again, one can verify that in P
′ agent w2 still
prefers u2 to u3. Thus, w2 prefers its partner, assigned by a stable matching whose corresponding
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closed subset includes ρ(q), to u3. However, this means that such kind of stable matching cannot
be blocked by {u3, w2}.
For a comparison, let us consider another stable quadruple q′ = (u1, w2, u4, w1). Since u1 prefers
w2 to w1 we are searching for a rotation which includes (u1, x) such that
either x = w2, (5)
or u1 prefers x over w2 and will obtain a partner which u1 prefers over x. (6)
Since pi1 includes (u1, w2), satisfying (5), we have that pi(q
′) = pi1.
As for ρ(q′), since w2 prefers u4 to u1, we need to find a rotation which includes (u4, w2). Since
pi3 includes (u4, w2), we have that ρ(q
′) = pi3. 
Rotations pi(q) and ρ(q) are critical concepts that will be used by our algorithm for finding robust
matchings. The next two lemmas provide tools which allow us to use these concepts conveniently.
We start by showing that pi(q) and ρ(q) are unique.
Lemma 3.18. Let q = (u∗, w∗, u, w) be a stable quadruple of a preference profile P . The following
holds.
1. If pi(q) exists, then it is unique.
2. If ρ(q) exists, then it is unique.
Proof. For the first statement, assume that rotation pi(q) exists with pi(q) =
((u′0, w′0), . . . , (u′r−1, w′r−1)) and u∗ = u′i. We distinguish between two cases.
Case (i): w∗ u∗ w. Thus, w∗ = w′i or w′i Pu∗ w∗ Pu∗ w′i+1 by definition of pi(q). In either case,
Proposition 3.6(ii) guarantees that pi(q) is unique.
Case (ii): w u∗ w∗. By the definition of pi(q), we have that w = w′i+1. By Proposition 3.6 (iii),
rotation pi(q) is unique.
Now, we turn to the second statement. Assume that rotation ρ(q) exists with ρ(q) =
((u′0, w′0), . . . , (u′r−1, w′r−1)) and w∗ = w′i. Again, we distinguish between two cases:
Case (i): u∗ w∗ u. This implies that u∗ = u′i−1 or u′i−1 Pw∗ u∗ Pw∗ u′i by definition of ρ(q). If
u∗ = u′i−1, then the uniqueness is guaranteed by Proposition 3.6(iii). If u
′
i−1 Pw∗ u∗ Pw∗ u′i, then
the uniqueness follows from Proposition 3.6(iv).
Case (ii): u w∗ u∗. By the definition of ρ(q), we have that u = u′i. By Proposition 3.6 (iv),
rotation ρ(q) is unique.
The following result is a centerpiece of the algorithm, specifying exactly which constraints need
to be fulfilled by a closed subset of rotations which corresponds to a robust matching.
Lemma 3.19. Let P0 be a profile and q = (u
∗, w∗, u, w) be a stable quadruple of P0. Let Q =
P [SH(P0, q)] denote the profile after we perform the swaps in SH(P0, q) on P0. The following
holds.
(i) Assume that pi(q) does not exist. If w∗ P0u∗ w, then each stable matching N ∈ SM(P0) has
w∗ Qu∗ N(u∗). If wP0u∗ w∗, then each N ∈SM(P0) has either N(u∗)=w∗ or w∗ Qu∗ N(u∗).
(ii) Assume that ρ(q) does not exist. If u∗ P0w∗ u, then each stable matching N ∈ SM(P0) has
u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗). If u P0w∗ u∗, then each N ∈ SM(P0) has either N(u∗) = w∗ or u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗).
(iii) If neither pi(q) nor ρ(q) exist, then SM(P0) ∩ SM(Q) = ∅.
Let S be a closed subset of rotations for P0 and let M be the corresponding stable matching.
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(iv) If pi(q) does not exist and ρ(q) exists but ρ(q) /∈ S, then M /∈ SM(Q).
(v) If ρ(q) exists and ρ(q) ∈ S, then M ∈ SM(Q).
(vi) If pi(q) exists and pi(q) /∈ S, then M ∈ SM(Q).
(vii) If pi(q) exists and pi(q) ∈ S and either ρ(q) does not exist or ρ(q) exists but ρ(q) /∈ S, then
M /∈ SM(Q).
Proof. Statement (i). Assume that pi(q) does not exist. Since q is a stable quadruple, by definition,
{{u∗, w}, {u,w∗}} is a stable set. First, let us consider the case when w∗ P0u∗ w. Since pi(q) does
not exist, by definition, (u∗, w∗) is not in any rotation. Neither is {u∗, w∗} in the W -optimal
stable matching of P0 because of the following. Since w
∗ P0u∗ w hold and {u,w} is in some stable
matching, say M , of P0, it follows that M(w
∗) P0w∗ u∗, implying that {u∗, w∗} is not in the W -
optimal stable matching. Hence, by Proposition 3.6(i), {u∗, w∗} is not in any stable matching of
P0. Thus, we only need to show that no stable matching N ∈ SM(P0) has N(u∗) Qu∗ w∗. Towards
a contradiction, suppose that there exists such a stable matching N with N(u∗) Qu∗ w∗. By
Observation 3.12(ii) and since w∗ P0u∗ w, it follows that P0u∗=Qu∗ , and so N(u∗) P0u∗ w∗, implying
that N(u∗) P0u∗ w∗ P0u∗ w because w∗ P0u∗ w. By the definition of stable quadruples, {u∗, w} is in
some stable matching. Thus, there are two stable matchings, where u∗ obtains a partner (namely,
N(u∗)) who is more preferred than w∗, and a partner (namely, w) who is less preferred than w∗.
By Proposition 3.6(i), this is a contradiction to the assumption that pi(q) does not exist.
Now, consider the case when w P0u∗ w∗. Since {{u∗, w}} is a stable set and pi(q) does not exist,
we infer that {u∗, w} is in the U -optimal stable matching, i.e., that every stable matching N ∈
SM(P0) has either N(u∗) = w or w P0u∗ N(u∗). By Observation 3.12(ii)(c), it follows that every
stable matching N ∈ SM(P0) has either N(u∗) = w∗ or w∗ Qu∗ N(u∗).
Statement (ii). Assume that ρ(q) does not exist. Again, we consider two cases, starting with
u∗ P0w∗ u. Since ρ(q) does not exist, we can infer that {u∗, w∗} does not belong to any stable
matching of P0. Indeed, if a stable matching containing {u∗, w∗} existed, then there would be a
rotation that changes the partner of w∗ from one which is less preferred than u∗ to u∗ (here, again
we use the fact that q is a quadruple and so w∗ is matched to u in some stable matching), with
respect to profile P0.
Thus, we only need to show that no stable matching N ∈ SM(P0) has N(w∗) Qw∗ u∗. Towards
a contradiction, suppose that there exists such a stable matching N with N(w∗) Qw∗ u∗. By
Observation 3.12(iii) and since u∗ P0w∗ w, it follows that P0w∗=Qw∗ and so that N(w∗) P0w∗ u∗,
implying that N(w∗) P0w∗ u∗ P0w∗ u because u∗ P0w∗ u. By the definition of stable quadruples,
{u,w∗} belongs to some stable matching. Summarizing, there exist two stable matchings where
w∗ is matched to a partner which is less preferred than u∗ and a partner which is more preferred
than u∗, respectively. However, this is a contradiction to the assumption that pi(q) does not exist.
Now, let us move to the case when u P0w∗ u∗. Recall that, since q is a stable quadruple, we
know that {u,w∗} belongs to some stable matching. Since ρ(q) does not exist by Proposition 3.6(i)
we infer that {u,w∗} is in the W -optimal stable matching. In other words, for every stable match-
ing N ∈ SM(P0) we have either u = N(w∗) or u P0w∗ N(w∗). By Observation 3.12(iii)(c), it follows
that every stable matching N ∈ SM(P0) has either N(w∗) = u∗ or u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗).
Statement (iii). Assume that neither pi(q) nor ρ(q) exists. We distinguish between two cases.
Case (1): w P0u∗ w∗. Since pi(q) does not exist, by statement (i), it follows that every stable
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matching N ∈ SM(P0) has either N(u∗) = w∗ or w∗ Qu∗ N(u∗). Consider an arbitrary stable
matching N ∈ SM(P0), and first let us analyze the case when N(u∗) = w∗. Since q is a stable
quadruple, there exists a matching, call it M ′, such that M ′(u∗) = w and M ′(u) = w∗. By our
assumption, u∗ prefers M ′ to N ; thus, by Proposition 3.2 we get that w∗ must prefer N to M ′,
i.e., it must hold that u∗ P0w∗ u. By statement (ii), that “u∗ P0w∗ u” and the assumption that
“rotation ρ(q) does not exist” imply that u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗). This contradicts our assumption that
N(u∗) = w∗. Now, let us move to the second alternative, when w∗ Qu∗ N(u∗). We know that ρ(q)
does not exist. Thus, by statement (ii), we get that u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗) because of the following.
• Either u∗ P0w∗ u, whence by statement (ii) we have u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗),
• or u P0w∗ u∗ and by statement (ii) we have that u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗) or that N(u∗) = w∗ (the latter
case has just been handled; either way, we have that u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗).
Yet, this implies that {u∗, w∗} is a blocking pair of N . Thus, N /∈ SM(Q).
Case (2): w∗ P0u∗ w. Since pi(q) does not exist, from statement (i) it follows that every stable
matching N ∈ SM(P0) satisfies w∗ Qu∗ N(u∗). In particular, it follows that {{u∗, w∗}} is not a
stable set in Q. By statement (ii), from this and from the assumption that ρ(q) does not exist, we
infer that u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗) (either u∗ P0w∗ u and we get u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗) directly from statement (ii),
or u P0w∗ u∗ and by statement (ii) we get that either u∗ Qw∗ N(w∗) or N(u∗) = w∗—and we have
already shown that in the latter case N /∈ SM(Q)). Thus, the pair {u∗, w∗} is blocking N in Q.
Summarizing, we have shown that no stable matching of P0 is stable for Q.
Statement (iv). Assume that pi(q) does not exist and ρ(q) exists but ρ(q) /∈ S. Since pi(q) does
not exist, by statement (i), for every stable matching N ∈ SM(P0) it holds that N(u∗) = w∗ or
w∗ Qu∗ N(u∗). This includes M , meaning that M(u∗) = w∗ or w∗ Qu∗ M(u∗).
We consider these two cases separately.
Case (1): M(u∗) = w∗. By statement (i), it follows that w P0u∗ w∗. Further, since q is a stable
quadruple, there exists a stable matching N ∈ SM(P0), such that N(u∗) = w and N(u) = w∗.
In P0, since u
∗ prefers N to M , by Proposition 3.2, it must be the case that w∗ prefers M to N ,
i.e., u∗ P0w∗ u. Thus, the rotation ρ(q) (which, by our assumption, is guaranteed to exist) operates
as follows: it changes the partner of w∗ from an agent that is less preferred than u∗ to u∗ or to an
agent that is more preferred than u∗ (regarding P0). Since ρ(q) /∈ S, we infer that in matching M
agent w∗ obtains a partner that is less preferred than u∗, i.e., u∗ P0w∗ M(w∗). This leads to a
contradiction with M(u∗) = w∗.
Case (2): w∗ Qu∗ M(u∗). Towards a contradiction, suppose that M is also stable for Q. This
implies that M(w∗) Qw∗ u∗. By Observation 3.12(iii)(b), we have that M(w∗) P0w∗ u. If u P0w∗ u∗,
then the rotation ρ(q) changes the partner of w∗ from u to some agent which is more preferred
than u (regarding the preferences in P0). Since, according to M , agent w
∗ already has a partner
that is more preferred than u, we infer that ρ(q) is the predecessor of some rotation in S, meaning
that itself ρ(q) ∈ S by the closedness of S—a contradiction. If u∗ P0w∗ u, then P0w∗=Qw∗ by
Observation 3.12(iii), and so we get that M(w∗) P0w∗ u∗ P0w∗ u because M(w∗) Qw∗ u∗. In this
case, rotation ρ(q) changes the partner of w∗ from an agent that is less preferred than u∗ to u∗ or
an agent who is more preferred than u∗. However, since in M agent w∗ already has a partner who
is preferred over u∗, we again infer that ρ(q) ∈ S—a contradiction.
Summarizing, we conclude that M /∈ SM(Q).
Statement (v). Let us assume that ρ(q) exists and ρ(q) ∈ S.
By Lemma 3.13, except {u∗, w∗}, no other unmatched pair with respect to M could be blocking
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Q. In the following, we claim that {u∗, w∗} is not blocking Q, implying that M is stable for Q. We
distinguish between two cases.
If u∗ P0w∗ u, then by the definition of ρ(q) and since ρ(q) ∈ S, it follows that M(w∗) = u∗ or
M(w∗) P0w∗ u∗. Moreover, by Observation 3.12(iii) we have that Qw∗=Qw∗ , implying M(w∗) = u∗
or M(w∗) Qw∗ u∗. Thus, {u∗, w∗} cannot be blocking M in Q.
If u P0w∗ u∗, then by the definition of ρ(q) and since ρ(q) ∈ S, it follows that M(w∗) P0w∗ u.
Moreover, by Observation 3.12(iii)(b) we obtain that M(w∗) Qw∗ u∗. Thus, {u∗, w∗} cannot be
blocking M in Q.
Statement (vi). Let us assume that pi(q) exists and pi(q) /∈ S. By Lemma 3.13, except {u∗, w∗},
no other unmatched pair with respect to M could be blocking Q. In the following, we claim that
{u∗, w∗} is not blocking Q, which implies that M is stable for Q. We distinguish between two cases.
If w∗ P0u∗ w, then by the definition of pi(q) and since pi(q) /∈ S, it follows that M(u∗) = w∗ or
M(u∗) P0u∗ w∗. Moreover, by Observation 3.12(ii) we have that Qu∗=Qu∗ , implying M(u∗) = w∗
or M(u∗) Qu∗ w∗. Thus, {u∗, w∗} cannot be blocking M in Q.
If w P0u∗ w∗, then by the definition of pi(q) and since pi(q) /∈ S, it follows that M(u∗) P0u∗ w.
Moreover, by Observation 3.12(ii)(b) we obtain that M(u∗) Qu∗ w∗. Thus, {u∗, w∗} cannot be
blocking M in Q.
Statement (vii). Assume that pi(q) exists and pi(q) ∈ S and either ρ(q) does not exist or it exists
but ρ(q) /∈ S.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that M is stable for Q. We distinguish between three
cases, in each case obtaining a contradiction.
Case 1: w∗ P0u∗ w. By the definition of pi(q) and since pi(q) ∈ S, referencing Proposition 3.9(i), it
follows that w∗ P0u∗ M(u∗). Thus, w∗ Qu∗ M(u∗) because P0u∗=Qu∗ (by Observation 3.12(ii)). In
particular, this implies that {u∗, w∗} is an unmatched pair in M . By assumption that M is stable
for Q, we must have that
M(w∗) Qw∗ u∗. (7)
If u∗ P0w∗ u, then by Observation 3.12(iii), we haveM(w∗) P0w∗ u∗ P0w∗ u. By the fact that {u,w∗} is
in some stable matching (recall that q is a stable quadruple), there are two stable matchings, where
w∗ obtains a partner (namely, u) who is less preferred than u∗, and a partner (namely, M(w∗))
who is more preferred than u∗. This implies that ρ(q) exists and that ρ(q) ∈ S—a contradiction.
If u P0w∗ u∗, then by Observation 3.12(iii) and by (7), we have that M(w∗) P0w∗ u P0w∗ u∗.
Again, by the fact that {u,w∗} is in some stable matching (recall that q is a stable quadruple),
there are two stable matchings, where w∗ obtains partner u, and a partner (namely, M(w∗)) who
is more preferred than u. This implies that ρ(q) exists such that ρ(q) ∈ S—a contradiction.
Case 2: w P0u∗ w∗ and M(u∗) 6= w∗. If we can show that w∗ Qu∗ M(u∗), then we can use
the same reasoning as we did for the first case to show the same contradiction. Thus it suffices to
prove that w∗ Qu∗ M(u∗).
By the definition of pi(q) and since pi(q) ∈ S, referencing Proposition 3.9(i), it follows that
M(u∗) = w or w P0u∗ M(u∗), and thus w∗ Qu∗ M(u∗) because M(u∗) 6= w∗ (by assumption) and
w∗ Qu∗ w. This finishes the proof for the second case.
Case 3: w P0u∗ w∗ and M(u∗) = w∗. Since q is a stable quadruple, {u∗, w} and {u,w∗} exist
in some stable matching of P0, say N . Thus, P0 admits two different stable matchings M and N ,
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where M(u∗) = w∗, N(u∗) = w, and N(w∗) = u. By the precondition that w P0u∗ w∗ and by
Proposition 3.2, we must have that u∗ w∗ u (i.e. w∗ prefers M to N). In particular, this means
that there must be a rotation which changes the partner of w∗ from one that is less preferred than
u∗ to agent u∗. Thus, ρ(q) exists and must be in S—a contradiction.
3.4 Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Robust Matchings
We now first present an O(n4)-time algorithm for finding a robust matching if it exists. Then we
use a Linear Programming (LP) formulation to show that perfect robust matchings and robust
matchings with minimum egalitarian cost can be found in polynomial time if they exist. Both
approaches crucially rely on (a) the one-to-one correspondence between the stable matchings and
the closed subsets of the rotation poset [18, Chapter 3.7], (b) the implications between the presence
of the two rotations pi(q) and ρ(q) of stable quadruples q derived in Lemma 3.19, and (c) the fact
that all stable quadruples can be computed in O(n4) time. The proof for (c) is roughly by iterating
over all possible rotations and building a lookup table that stores for all pairs (x, y) ∈ U × W
of agents a constant number of rotations that make the partner of x less preferred to y or more
preferred to y. For given stable quadruple q, rotations pi(q) and ρ(q) can then be looked up in the
table. We state this observation for reference below.
Proposition 3.20. Determining all stable quadruples q and their respective rotations pi(q) and
ρ(q) as defined in Definition 3.16 can be done in O(n4) time.
Proof. By Proposition 3.1 and by Proposition 3.9(ii), all O(n4) stable quadruples can be found in
O(n4) time.
For each stable quadruple q, we show how to find pi(q) and ρ(q), in O(1) time for a given
stable quadruple q. We build in O(n4) time a size-O(n2) look-up table T to store for each ordered
pair (x, y) ∈ U ×W the following up to six rotations:
1. Let σ1(x, y) denote the rotation which changes the partner of x from someone who is more
preferred than y to y.
Formally, σ1(x, y) := ((u
′
0, w
′
0), . . . , (u
′
r−1, w′r−1)) such that x = u′i and y = w
′
i+1 for some i ∈
{0, . . . , r−1}. Note that the uniqueness of this rotation is guaranteed by Proposition 3.6(iii).
2. Let σ2(x, y) denote the rotation which changes the partner of x from someone who is more
preferred than y to someone who is less preferred than y.
Formally, σ2(x, y) := ((u
′
0, w
′
0), . . . , (u
′
r−1, w′r−1)) such that x = u′i and w
′
i x y x w′i+1
for some i ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}. Note that the uniqueness of this rotation is guaranteed by
Proposition 3.6(ii).
3. Let σ3(x, y) denote the rotation which changes the partner of x from y to someone who is
less preferred than y.
Formally, σ3(x, y) := ((u
′
0, w
′
0), . . . , (u
′
r−1, w′r−1)) such that x = u′i and y = w
′
i for some i ∈
{0, . . . , r− 1}. Note that the uniqueness of this rotation is guaranteed by Proposition 3.6(ii).
Moreover, the existence of σ2(x, y) precludes the existence of σ1(x, y) and σ3(x, y) because
σ2(x, y) implies that {x, y} is not in any stable matching while σ1(x, y) or σ3(x, y) implies
that {x, y} is some stable matching.
4. Let τ1(y, x) denote the rotation which changes the partner of y from someone who is less
preferred than x to x.
Formally, τ1(y, x) := ((u
′
0, w
′
0), . . . , (u
′
r−1, w′r−1)) such that y = w′i and x = u
′
i−1 for some i ∈
{0, . . . , r−1}. Note that the uniqueness of this rotation is guaranteed by Proposition 3.6(iii).
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x : . . . . . .  y  . . . . . .
σ2(x, y)
σ1(x, y) σ3(x, y)
y : . . . . . .  x  . . . . . .
τ2(y, x)
τ3(y, x) τ1(y, x)
Figure 1: Illustration for the six rotations defined in the proof of Proposition 3.20.
5. Let τ2(y, x) denote the rotation which changes the partner of y from someone who is less
preferred than x to someone who is more preferred than x.
Formally, τ2(y, x) := ((u
′
0, w
′
0), . . . , (u
′
r−1, w′r−1)) such that y = w′i and u
′
i−1 y x y u′i
for some i ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}. Note that the uniqueness of this rotation is guaranteed by
Proposition 3.6(iv).
6. Let τ3(x, y) denote the rotation which changes the partner of y from x to someone who is
more preferred than x.
Formally, τ1(y, x) := ((u
′
0, w
′
0), . . . , (u
′
r−1, w′r−1)) such that y = w′i and x = u
′
i for some i ∈
{0, . . . , r−1}. Note that the uniqueness of this rotation is guaranteed by Proposition 3.6(iv).
Moreover, the existence of τ2(y, x) precludes the existence of τ1(y, x) and τ3(y, x) because
τ2(y, x) implies that {x, y} is not in any stable matching while τ1(y, x) or τ3(y, x) implies that
{x, y} is some stable matching.
Figure 1 illustrates the six rotations we have just defined.
Now, we continue with the determination of ρ(q) and pi(q). Let q = (u∗, w∗, u, w).
pi(q) :=

σ2(u
∗, w∗), if w∗ u∗ w and σ2(u∗, w∗) exists,
σ3(u
∗, w∗), if w∗ u∗ w and σ3(u∗, w∗) exists,
σ2(u
∗, w), if w u∗ w∗ and σ1(u∗, w) exists,
undefined, otherwise.
ρ(q) :=

τ1(w
∗, u∗), if u∗ w∗ u and τ1(w∗, u∗) exists,
τ2(w
∗, u∗), if u∗ w∗ u and τ2(w∗, u∗) exists,
τ3(w
∗, u), if u u∗ u∗ and τ3(w∗, u) exists,
undefined, otherwise.
One can verify that the above construction corresponds to Definition 3.16. Since there are O(n2)
rotations and n2 ordered pairs, the whole table, containing O(n2) entries, can be determined in
O(n4) time. (Note that, for a given rotation ρ, we can first find the agents who are affected by the
rotation in O(n) time, and, for each of the affected agents z, find in O(n) time all the pairs (z, w)
such that ρ needs to be added to the table entry of (z, w).) After computing the table, we can deter-
mine in constant time the two rotations pi(q) and ρ(q) for each q from the O(n4) stable quadruples,
by looking up into the table. In total, the running time is O(n4). (of Proposition 3.20) 
We now prove our main result for the Robust Matching problem.
Theorem 3.21. Given an instance of Robust Matching with 2n agents, in O(n4) time we can
either find a d-robust matching or correctly report that no such matching exists.
Proof. Our approach is described in Algorithm 1. Let P be the profile in the given instance.
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ALGORITHM 1: Computing d-robust matchings.
Input: A preference profile P with agent sets U and W ,
and an integer d ∈ N.
Output: A d-robust matching for P or ⊥ if none exists.
1 Compute the rotation digraph G(P )
2 G1(P )← G(P )
3 foreach stable quadruple q with |SH(P, q)| ≤ d do
4 Compute pi(q) and ρ(q) if they exist using Prop. 3.20
5 if 6 ∃pi(q) and 6 ∃ρ(q) then return ⊥
6 if ∃pi(q) and ∃ρ(q) then G1(P )←G1(P )+(ρ(q), pi(q))
7 D ← {pi(q) | q is a stable quadruple with |SH(P, q)| ≤ d
8 s.t. ∃pi(q) but 6 ∃ρ(q)}
9 G2(P )← G1(P )−D− {v ∈ V (G1(P )) | ∃ a dipath in G1(P )
10 from a vertex in D to v}
11 A← {ρ(q) | q is a stable quadruple with |SH(P, q)| ≤ d
12 s.t. ∃ρ(q) but 6 ∃pi(q)}
13 if A * V (G2(P )) then return ⊥
14 T ← A ∪ {v ∈ V (G2(P )) | ∃ a dipath in G2(P ) from v
15 to some vertex in A}
16 return the matching corresponding to the closed set T of
rotations
To obtain an O(n4) algorithm we work
with the rotation digraph G(P ) (see Def-
inition 3.7 and Proposition 3.9). Call a
vertex subset S in a directed graph G
closed, if there is no arc in G point-
ing outwards from S. Recall that a
stable matching for P corresponds to a
closed subset of the rotations in the ro-
tation poset, i.e., a closed vertex sub-
set S of G(P ). Intuitively, Algorithm 1
first adds arcs to G(P ) in lines 2 to
6 that model implications between ro-
tations contained in d-robust matchings
given in Lemma 3.19. Then, it removes
rotations from G(P ) that cannot oc-
cur in d-robust matchings according to
Lemma 3.19 in lines 7 and 9. Finally, it
checks in line 14 whether there is a closed
subset of rotations which contains the re-
quired rotations for d-robust matchings
according to Lemma 3.19.
We now prove the correctness and then analyze the running time. Below, when referring to
G1(P ), we mean the graph G1(P ) obtained from G(P ) after line 6 and by G2(P ) we mean the
graph obtained after line 10.
We claim that, if Algorithm 1 returns something different from ⊥, then it is a d-robust
matching. We first show that the set T computed in line 14 is a closed subset of rotations in the
rotation poset: Clearly, T is closed in G2(P ). Since G2(P ) is obtained from G1(P ) by removing
vertices together with all of their successors, T is closed in G1(P ) as well. Since G1(P ) is obtained
from G(P ) by adding arcs, T is closed in G(P ), implying the claim. By Proposition 3.9, there is
a stable matching M for P associated with T .
Since T is a closed subset, Lemma 3.19 (iv) to (vii) apply. We now verify that, for each stable
quadruple q with |SH(P, q)| ≤ d, we have M ∈ SM(P [SH(P, q)]) (recall that P [SH(P, q)] is the
profile obtained from P by performing the swaps in SH(P, q)). By Lemma 3.15 it then follows
that M is d-robust.
Let q be a stable quadruple of P such that |SH(P, q)| ≤ d. Suppose that ρ(q) exists. If pi(q) does
not exist, then ρ(q) ∈ T by line 11 and line 14, and thus M ∈ SM(P [SH(P, q)]) by Lemma 3.19 (v).
If pi(q) exists, then, since T is closed and by line 6, either pi(q) /∈ T , giving M ∈ SM(P [SH(P, q)])
by Lemma 3.19 (vi), or ρ(q) ∈ T , giving M ∈ SM(P [SH(P, q)]) by Lemma 3.19 (v). Now suppose
that ρ(q) does not exist. Then, pi(q) exists because otherwise we would have returned ⊥ in line 5.
By lines 7 and 9, pi(q) /∈ T , giving M ∈ SM(P [SH(P, q)]) by Lemma 3.19 (vi). Thus, indeed the
returned matching is d-robust.
It remains to show that a d-robust matching is returned if there is a d-robust matching M
for P . By the above, it suffices to show that ⊥ is not returned in lines 5 and 13. By Lemma 3.15,
M ∈ SM(P [SH(P, q)]) for each stable quadruple q with |SH(P, q)| ≤ d. Thus, by Lemma 3.19 (iii)
at least one of ρ(q) and pi(q) exists, meaning that ⊥ cannot be returned in line 5. If ⊥ was returned
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due to line 13, then there is a stable quadruple q with |SH(P, q)| ≤ d such that pi(q) does not exist
and ρ(q) exists and, furthermore, ρ(q) ∈ V (G1(P )) \ V (G2(P )). Let S be the closed subset of
rotations in G(P ) associated with M . By Lemma 3.19 (iv), ρ(q) ∈ S. Since ρ(q) /∈ V (G2(P )), by
lines 7 and 9, there is a stable quadruple q′ with |SH(P, q′)| ≤ d such that pi(q′) ∈ D and there is
a path (possibly of length zero) from pi(q′) to ρ(q) in G1(P ). Since ρ(q) ∈ S, thus also pi(q′) ∈ S.
By line 9, ρ(q′) does not exist. Thus, by Lemma 3.19 (vii) M /∈ SM(P [SH(P, q′)]), a contradiction
to M being d-robust. Thus, indeed a d-robust matching is returned if there is one.
The running time of O(n4) can be obtained as follows. By Proposition 3.9, the rotation digraph
in line 1 can be computed in O(n2) time. Lines 3 and 4 can be carried out in O(n4) time by
Proposition 3.20. Thus, clearly, lines 2 to 6 can be carried out in O(n4) time. Lines 7–9 can be done
in O(n4) because G(P ) contains O(n2) vertices. Analogously, lines 11–16 take O(n4) time.
Example 3.22. To illustrate Algorithm 1, consider the profile P given in Example 1.1 and let d = 1.
P admits three rotations, pi1 = ((u1, w2), (u2, w3), (u3, w1), (u4, w1)), pi2 = ((u1, w3), (u3, w1)), and
pi3 = ((u2, w4), (u4, w2)). There are ten stable quadruples for d = 1. The corresponding pi(q) and
ρ(q) are summarized in the lower left table.
Stable quadruple q
with |SH(P, q)| ≤ 1 pi(q) ρ(q)
(u1, w1, u3, w3) pi1 pi2
(u1, w2, u4, w1) pi1 pi3
(u1, w2, u4, w3) pi1 pi3
(u1, w3, u2, w2) no pi1
(u1, w4, u2, w1) pi2 pi3
(u2, w1, u3, w2) pi3 pi2
(u2, w2, u4, w4) pi1 pi3
(u2, w4, u3, w3) no pi1
(u3, w1, u4, w4) no pi1
(u3, w2, u4, w3) pi2 pi3
The digraphs G(P ) and G1(P ) = G2(P ) constructed
in Algorithm 1 are depicted in the lower right figure.
pi1
pi2 pi3
G(P ) :
pi1
pi2 pi3
G1(P ) = G2(P ) :
One can verify that A = {pi1} (see rows 4, 8, 9 in the
table). T = {pi1, pi2, pi3} is the only closed set in G2
that includes pi1, which corresponds to M2. Indeed
our algorithm will return M2 (see Example 1.1) as
the only 1-robust matching.

Now we turn to the problem variants where we look for a perfect d-robust matching or one with
minimum egalitarian cost. Our polynomial-time algorithm for these variants builds on a Linear Pro-
gramming (LP) formulation which finds a stable matching. This LP formulation in turn is based on
the one-to-one correspondence between the stable matchings and the closed subsets of the rotation
poset [18, Chapter 3.7]. A crucial property of this formulation is that its constraint matrix is totally
unimodular. Hence, each extreme point of the polytope defined by this formulation is integral.
The LP formulation is as follows. Let P0 be a preference profile with two disjoint sets, U and W ,
each containing n agents. Let R(P ) be the set of rotations for P0 and let G(P0) with arc set E(P0)
be the rotation digraph of P0 regarding the precedence relation BP0 ; by Proposition 3.9(ii), both
the rotation set R(P0) and the rotation digraph G(P0) can be computed in O(n
2) time. For each
rotation ρ ∈ R(P0), we introduce a variable xρ with box constraints 0 ≤ xρ ≤ 1, where xρ = 1 will
correspond to adding ρ to the solution subset while xρ = 0 means that ρ will not be taken into the
subset. By Gusfield and Irving [18, Chapter 3.7], the constraint matrix of the constraints
xρ − xpi ≤ 0, ∀pi, ρ ∈ R(P0) with (pi, ρ) ∈ E(P0), (LP1)
0 ≤ xρ ≤ 1, ∀ρ ∈ R(P0), (LP2)
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is totally unimodular and thus there is a solution in which each variable takes either value zero
or one. In this way, the set S = {ρ | xρ = 1}, defined by including exactly those rotations whose
variable values are set to one is closed under the rotation poset and thus defines a stable matching.
Before we state our main result for the Robust Matching problem, we recall a condition
which ensures that an LP formulation gives an integral solution.
Proposition 3.23 ([7]). If A ∈ {−1, 0,+1}nˆ×mˆ and b ∈ Zmˆ such that each row in A has at most
one +1 and at most one −1, then A is totally unimodular, and every extreme point of the system
Ax ≤ b, x ∈ Nmˆ0 is integral.
Theorem 3.24. Finding a d-robust perfect matching and finding a d-robust matching with mini-
mum egalitarian cost, if they exist, can both be done in polynomial time.
Proof. Following Lemma 3.19, we will add some additional constraints to the LP given by (LP1) and
(LP2), which results in an LP whose constraint matrix remains totally unimodular (see Proposi-
tion 3.23). To determine whether there is a d-robust matching for our instance, we need to consider
every possible profile that differs from the original profile by at most d swaps. For 2n agents,
there are, however, (2n)O(d) such profiles. To avoid this, we characterize these profiles by stable
quadruples, using Lemma 3.15. To achieve this, we compute for each stable quadruple q with
|SH(P0, q)| ≤ d the two specific rotations pi(q) and ρ(q) as defined in Definition 3.16.
As already discussed, pi(q) and ρ(q) may not exist. If they exist, then by Lemma 3.18 they are
unique. Moreover, by Lemma 3.19(iii), we may assume that at least one of pi(q) and ρ(q) exist as
otherwise SM(P ) ∩ SM(P [SH(P, q)]) = ∅, implying that P does not admit a d-robust matching.
We distinguish between three cases, in each case describing how to add some constraints to the LP
defined above.
Case (1): Both pi(q) and ρ(q) exist. Add the constraint xpi(q) − xρ(q) ≤ 0. (LP3.1)
By Lemma 3.19, statements (v), (vi), and (vii), the stable matching defined according to a closed
subset is stable in P [SH(P0, q)] if and only if xρ(q) = 1 or xpi(q) = 0.
Case (2): pi(q) exists but ρ(q) does not. Add the constraint xpi(q) = 0 (LP3.2)
The above constraint is justified by Lemma 3.19(vii).
Case (3): pi(q) does not exist but ρ(q) exists. Add the constraint xρ(q) = 1 (LP3.3)
This constraint is justified by Lemma 3.19, statements (iv) and (v).
Note that in each of the three cases, we add to the constraint matrix a row which has at most one
+1, at most one −1 and the remaining values are all 0s. Thus, we can infer by Proposition 3.23 that
the resulting constraint matrix is still totally unimodular and all primal solutions to our problem
are integral. Since the matrix has O(n4) rows and O(n2) columns, solving the thus constructed LP
can be done in polynomial time.
Since all stable matchings match the same set of agents (Proposition 2.3), it is apparent from
the above LP that finding a d-robust and perfect matching if it exists can be done in polynomial
time. Finding a d-robust matching, if one exists, with minimum egalitarian cost can also be done
in polynomial time by the following: For each rotation ρ we can compute how adding ρ to a stable
matching changes its egalitarian score. Then, it is sufficient to add an appropriate optimization
objective to the LP constructed above.
28
4 Robustness and Preferences with Ties: NP-hardness
When the input preferences may contain ties, we consider a swap to be a pair of two agents that
belong to two neighboring tied classes. For the case with ties, the preference list  of each agent
may be expressed as a transitive and complete binary relation on the set of the agents who she
finds acceptable. The expression “x i y” means that i weakly prefers x over y (i.e. x is better or
as good as y). We use i to denote the asymmetric part (i.e. x i y and ¬(y i x)) and ∼i to
denote the symmetric part of i (i.e. x i y and y i x).
Formally, we define the swap distance τ(i,i′) between two preference lists with ties as follows.
δ(i,i′) :=

∞, if i and i′ have
different acceptable sets,
|{(x, y) ∈i| (y, x) ∈i′}|+ |{(x, y) ∈∼i| (x, y) /∈∼i}|, otherwise.
In particular, if an agent has a preference list (a, b, c), meaning that all three agents are tied on
the first position, then moving to the list c  (a, b) requires two swaps (swapping a with c and b
with c). Finding a stable matching can be done in O(n2) time even when ties are present [19].
In contrast, presence of ties makes Robust Matching NP-hard:
Theorem 4.1. Robust Matching with ties is NP-hard even when the number d of swaps allowed
is one.
Proof. We reduce from Independent Set. Let I = (G, k) be an instance of Independent Set.
Further, let V (G) = {v1, . . . , vn} and E(G) = {e1, . . . , em} denote the set of vertices and the set
of edges in G respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that the number n of vertices in
V is at least three and the solution size k is at least two. We construct an instance of Robust
Matching with two sets of agents, U and W , and with the number of allowed swaps equal to
d = 1.
Agent set U . This set consists of the following n+ 2m+ 2 agents.
U = V ∪ E ∪ F ∪A, where
V = {v1, . . . , vn},
E = {e1, . . . , em},
F = {f1, . . . , fm},
A = {a0, a1}.
Agent set W . This set consists of the following n+ 2m+ 2 agents.
W = T ∪ S ∪ EV ∪B, where
T = {t1, . . . , tn−k},
S = {s1, . . . , sk},
EV = {evi` , e
vj
` | e` ∈ E(G) with e` = {vi, vj}},
B = {b0, b1}.
Note that we use vi (resp. e`) for both a vertex and its corresponding vertex agent (resp. an edge
and its corresponding edge agent). It will, however, be clear from the context what we are referring
to.
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The preference lists of these agents are defined as follows, where [?] means that the elements
in ? are ranked in an arbitrary but fixed order, while (?) means that the elements in ? are tied. The
symbol . . . at the end of each preference list denotes an arbitrary but fixed order of the remaining
not mentioned agents.
Preference lists of the agents from U .
∀i ∈ [n] vi : (T )  b0  [{evi` | e` ∈ E(G) such that vi ∈ e`}]  (S)  . . . ,
∀` ∈ [m] with e` = {vi, vj} e` : (evi` , e
vj
` , b0)  . . . ,
∀` ∈ [m] with e` = {vi, vj} and i < j f` : evj`  evi`  b0  . . . ,
a0 : b0  b1  . . . ,
a1 : b1  b0  . . . .
Preference lists of the agents in W .
∀i ∈ [n− k] ti : (V )  a0  a1  . . . ,
∀i ∈ [k] si : (V )  a0  a1  . . . ,
∀` ∈ [m] with e` = {vi, vj} evi` : e`  a0  f`  vi  . . . ,
e
vj
` : e`  a0  f`  vj  . . . ,
b0 : a0  a1  . . . ,
b1 : a1  a0  . . . .
We use P to denote the above preference profile. Before we prove the correctness of our con-
struction, we observe some properties which every stable matching must satisfy.
Claim 1. Every stable matching M for U and W with respect to the initial preferences must satisfy
the following.
1. Each agent ti ∈ T must be matched with an agent from V .
2. Each agent aj ∈ A must be matched with bj.
3. For each edge e` ∈ E(G) with e` = {vi, vj}, the agents e` and f` must have {M(e`),M(f`)} =
{evi` , e
vj
` }.
4. Each agent si ∈ S must be matched with an agent from V .
Proof. The first statement is straight-forward because every vertex agent vi ∈ V and every selector
agent tj ∈ T rank each other at the first position.
Analogously, we obtain the second statement.
Now, consider an arbitrary edge e` ∈ E(G) and let vi and vj denote the endpoints of edge e`.
Since agent a0 is already matched with b0 we can neglect them from the preference lists of e`, f`, e
vi
` ,
and e
vj
` . Consequently, one can verify that the partners of e` and f` must be from {evi` , e
vj
` }.
By the first three statement, there are k agents left from V who each must be matched with
some agent from S because every agent from S ranks every agent from V at the first position.
(of Claim 1) 
We show that G admits an independent set of size k if and only if the profile P has a stable
matching M that remains stable in each profile P ′ that differs from P by at most one swap.
30
For the “only if” direction, let V ′ = {vi1 , . . . , vik} be an independent set of k vertices with i1 <
i2 < . . . < ik. For the sake of convenience, let V \ V ′ = {vj1 , . . . , vjn−k} with j1 < j2 < . . . < jn−k.
We claim that the following perfect matching M is stable in every profile which differs from the
original one by at most one swap.
M = {{a0, b0}, {a1, b1}} ∪ {{{sr, vir} | vir ∈ V ′}} ∪
{{tr, vjr} | vjr ∈ V \ V ′} ∪
{{e`, evi` }, {f`, evj} | e` = {vi, vj} for some e` ∈ E(G) and vi ∈ V ′} ∪
{{e`, evi` }, {f`, evj} | e` = {vi, vj} for some e` ∈ E(G) and {vi, vj} ∩ V ′ = ∅ and i < j}.
Note that the partners of S and T can be of arbitrary order, and that the partners of the agents e`
and f` for which none of the endpoints of the corresponding edge e` are in the independent set S
can also be swapped. We fix this order for the sake of the simplicity of the reasoning.
One can verify that M is stable in the original profile P . To see why it remains stable in every
profile, denoted as P ′, that differs from the original one by at most one swap, we observe the
following.
1. No agent aj from A is involved in a blocking pair because for each agent y 6= bj = M(aj)
other than aj ’s partner bj it holds that if aj shall prefer y to bj in P
′, then this agent y must
be b1−j . However, agent b1−j will still prefer her partner a1−j to aj because P and P ′ differ
by only one swap.
2. Analogously, no agent bj from B is involved in a blocking pair.
3. No agent z from S ∪ T is involved in a blocking pair because of the following. The partner of
z is an agent from V . For each agent y 6= M(z) other than z’s partner M(z) if agents z and
y would form a blocking pair in P ′ then z would have preferred y to an agent from M(z). To
achieve this, however, we need at least |V | − 1 swaps, which is more than two.
4. Analogously, no agent e` from E is involved in a blocking pair because of the following. The
partner M(e`) of e` is an agent from {evi` , e
vj
` } with e` = {vi, vj}. For each agent y 6= M(e`)
other than e`’s partner M(e`) if e` would form with y a blocking pair in P
′ then she must
have preferred y to her partner M(e`). To achieve this, we would need at least 2 swaps.
5. No agent f` from F is involved in a blocking pair because of the following. The partner
of f` is an agent from {evi` , e
vj
` } with e = {vi, vj}. For each agent y 6= M(f`) other than
f`’s partner M(f`) if agent f` would form with y a blocking pair of M , then she must have
preferred y to M(f`). By the preference list of f` and by the definition of M this agent y must
be an agent ev` with v ∈ e and M(ev` ) = e`. However, agent y will still prefer her partner e`
to f` as the swap distance between e` and f` in the initial preference list of e
v
` is two.
6. Agents vi and e
vj
` with vi 6= vj cannot form a blocking pair of M in P ′ because the swap
distance between e
vj
` and M(vi) ∈ S∪T in the initial preference list of vi is at least |S|, which
is more than one.
Thus, the only possible blocking pairs would involve vi and e
vi
` with vi ∈ e` for some e` ∈ E(G).
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that {vi, evi` } is blocking M in P ′. This implies that M(vi) ∈
S and M(evi` ) = f`. However, by construction, M(vi) ∈ S implies that vi ∈ V ′ and M(evi` ) = f`
implies that vi /∈ V ′—a contradiction.
For the “if” direction, let M be a stable matching that is stable in every profile that differs
from the original one by one swap. We claim that V ′ = {vi | M(vi) ∈ S} is an independent set of
size k. Obviously V ′ has k vertices by our observation above that every agent vi is matched to an
agent that is either from T or from S, and |S| = k. To show that V ′ is an independent set, suppose
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for the sake of contradiction that V ′ contains two adjacent vertices vi and vj and let e` = {vi, vj}
be the incident edge. This means that M(vi),M(vj) ∈ S. Then, consider the profile P ′ that differs
from P by one swap in the preference list of evi` , depicted as follows:
evi` : e`  a0  vi  f`.
Since vi prefers agent e
vi
` to its partner which is from S, the stability of M implies that M(e
vi
` ) = e`;
recall that M(evi` ) cannot be matched to a0 as reasoned before. Consequently, M(e
vj
` ) = f`.
However, consider the profile P ′′ that differs from P by one swap in the preference list of evj` ,
depicted as follows:
e
vj
` : e`  a0  vj  f`.
Since vi prefers agent e
vj
` to its partner which is from S, it follows that M is not stable in P
′′ as
we have just reasoned that M(e
vj
` ) = f` but vj prefers vj to f` in P
′′–a contradiction.
5 Nearly Stable Matchings
We now present our results on the complexity of finding nearly stable matchings which are per-
fect or within a given egalitarian cost bound. We start in Section 5.1 by observing that all four
problems variants of near stability are NP-hard. Indeed, we provide a stronger result, which says
that under the standard complexity theory assumption P 6= NP the minimization variants of all
considered problems do not admit a polynomial-time polynomial-factor approximation algorithm.
In Section 5.2 we study the influence of the number of allowed swaps on the complexity of the
problem variants.
5.1 Classical and Approximation Hardness
To show hardness, we will focus on the so-called gap variants of our problems, and prove that these
gap variants are NP-hard. These gap problems can be solved by the corresponding approximation
algorithms so that their NP-hardness will rule out polynomial-time approximation algorithms for
our problem. Loosely speaking, an α-gap variant of some minimization problem Q has, as input, a
specific instance I of Q and a cost upper bound q ∈ N and asks whether 1. I admits a solution of
cost at most q, or 2. each solution for I has cost at least α·q (without requirement on the answer
when the optimum solution is in the “gap” interval (q, α·q)). Note that, to decide between these
two options we can use a factor-α approximation algorithm (if it exists), an algorithm that is
guaranteed to find a solution of cost at most α·opt where opt is the minimum cost. Hence, if the
α-gap problem is NP-hard, a polynomial-time factor-α approximation algorithm implies P = NP.
To make the presentation easier, we use the following decision-focused definition of approxima-
tion algorithms, which only solve the gap variant of an optimization problem. By the reasoning
above, ruling out the existence of such approximation algorithms also rules out the existence the
standard form approximation algorithms which produce solutions.
Definition 5.1. Let poly : N → N be a polynomial whose domains and co-domains are on the
positive integers. An algorithm A is a polynomial-time and poly-approximation algorithm for
Globally Nearly Stable Perfect Matching (Global-Near+Perf) if for each preference
profile P and each positive integer dG ∈ N, the algorithm A runs in time |P |O(1) and satisfies
32
the following: (1) if P admits a globally dG-nearly stable and perfect matching, then A returns
“yes”, and (2) if P admits no globally poly(dG) · dG-nearly stable and perfect matching, then A
returns “no”.
If such an algorithm exists, then we also say that Global-Near+Perf admits a polynomial-
time and polynomial-factor approximation algorithm.
An approximation algorithm for Locally Nearly Stable Perfect Matching (Local-
Near+Perf) is defined analogously. For the variant where an additional objective is to achieve a
given egalitarian cost, we use an even weaker notion that allows for bi-criteria approximation.
Definition 5.2. Let poly1, poly2 : N → N be two polynomials whose domains and co-domains are
on the positive integers. An algorithm A is a polynomial-time and (poly1, poly2)-approximation
algorithm for Globally Nearly Stable Egalitarian Matching (Global-Near+Egal) if
for each preference profile P and each positive integer dG ∈ N, the algorithm A runs in time |P |O(1)
and satisfies the following: (1) if P admits a globally dG-nearly stable matching with egalitarian
cost at most η, then A returns “yes”, and (2) if P admits no globally poly1(dG) · dG-nearly stable
matching with egalitarian cost at most poly2(η) · η, then A returns “no”.
If such an algorithm exists, then we also say that Global-Near+Egal admits a polynomial-
time and polynomial-factor approximation algorithm.
Here, again an approximation algorithm for Locally Nearly Stable Egalitarian Match-
ing (Local-Near+Egal) is defined analogously.
Theorem 5.3. For each Π ∈ {Global-Near+Egal, Global-Near+Perf, Local-
Near+Perf, Local-Near+Egal}, Π is NP-hard, and does not admit a polynomial-time
polynomial-factor approximation algorithms, unless P = NP. For Local-Near+Perf and
Local-Near+Egal, the statement holds even if dL = 1.
Proof. The NP-hardness will follow from the inapproximability results by setting the corresponding
approximation factors to 1. Thus, we only need to show the inapproximability results, which are
based on the same basic construction. We first give the details of the construction. Then, we prove
that, on the instances resulting from the construction, approximability of Global-Near+Perf,
Global-Near+Egal, Local-Near+Perf, or Local-Near+Egal implies polynomial-time
solvability of all NP-complete problems.
Let poly1, poly2 : N → N be two arbitrary polynomials. We will show non-existence of any
polynomial-time and poly-approximation algorithm, using a reduction which introduces a gap in
the near stability between an optimally nearly stable solution and any other nearly stable solution.
We reduce from Independent Set, which has, as input, an undirected graph G with vertex
set V (G) and edge set E(G) and a positive integer k ∈ N, and asks whether G contains an
independent set of size k, i.e. a k-vertex subset of V ′ ⊆ V (G) of pairwise non-adjacent vertices. Let
I = (G, k) be an instance of Independent Set. Let V (G) = {v1, . . . , vn} and E(G) = {e1, . . . , em}
denote the set of vertices and the set of edges in G, respectively. We interpret the edges as two-
element subsets of V (G). For each vertex vi ∈ V , by E(vi) we denote the set of edges incident with
vertex vi in G.
From G we will construct a preference profile P . The lower thresholds for the gap problems we
are constructing are as follows. We define threshold for the number of swaps for a globally nearly
stable matching as dG := m+n, the threshold for the number of swaps per agent of a locally nearly
stable matching as dL := 1, and the threshold for the egalitarian cost of a globally dG-nearly stable
33
matching as η := k+ (poly1(dG)·dG + poly1(dL)·dL + 2) · (3m+ (2n+ k) · k+ (2n− k) · (n− k)). For
ease of notation, let d∗G := poly1(dG)·dG + poly1(dL)·dL + 1, and η∗ := poly2(η) · η + 2.
Construction. We construct a profile P as follows. We introduce the following disjoint sets of
agents: V, T,E, F (men); W,S,R,EV (women); and two disjoint sets A∪B and C ∪D of auxiliary
agents. Sets V and W will represent the vertices of G, sets R, S, and T will force a selection of
k vertices, and sets E, EV , and F will ensure that the selected vertices are pairwise nonadjacent.
The auxiliary agents from A∪B enforce that only swaps of some specific agents are relevant while
the auxiliary agents from C ∪ D require that each matching within some appropriate egalitarian
cost must be perfect.
The non-auxiliary agents. Specifically, the non-auxiliary sets contain the following agents:
V := {vi | vi ∈ V (G)}, W := {wi | vi ∈ V (G)},
T := {ti | vi ∈ V (G)}, S := {si | i ∈ [k]},
R := {ri | i ∈ [n− k]},
E := {e` | e` ∈ E(G)}, EV := {evi` , e
vj
` | e` = {vi, vj} for some edge e` ∈ E(G)}, and
F := {f` | e` ∈ E(G)}.
Note that we use vi (resp. e`) for both a vertex and its corresponding vertex agent (resp. an
edge and its corresponding edge agent). It will, however, be clear from the context what we are
referring to. The preference lists of the above agents are defined as follows (men are placed on the
left and women on the right). For the sake of readability the non-auxiliary agents are omitted in
each list, and we will describe them in detail later on.
∀vi ∈ V (G) : vi : wi  [{evi` | e` ∈ E(vi)}]  s1  . . .  sk, wi : vi  ti,
ti : wi  r1  . . .  rn−k,
∀j ∈ [n− k] : rj : t1  . . .  tn,
∀j ∈ [k] : sj : v1  . . .  vn,
∀e` = {vi, vj} ∈ E(G) with i < j : e` : evi`  e
vj
` , e
vi
` : e`  vi  f`,
f` : e
vi
`  e
vj
` , e
vj
` : e`  vj  f`.
The type-one auxiliary agents A ∪ B. These agents ensure that only the swaps from the
agents of W ∪ E are relevant. We say that the auxiliary agents in A ∪ B are of type one. For
each agent x from V ∪ T ∪ F ∪ S ∪ R ∪ EV and for each two consecutive agents y1 and y2 in x’s
preference list (as described above), we introduce d∗G auxiliary agents a
1
x(y1, y2), . . . , a
d∗G
x (y1, y2) to
A and d∗G auxiliary agents b
1
x(y1, y2), . . . , b
d∗G
x (y1, y2) to B with the following preference lists: (i) If
x ∈ V ∪ T ∪ F , then for all i ∈ [d∗G] let the preference lists of aix(y1, y2) and bix(y1, y2) be aix(y1, y2)
and aix(y1, y2)  x, respectively, and add all d∗G auxiliary agents bix(y1, y2) between agents y1 and y2
in the preference list of x. (ii) Otherwise, meaning that x ∈ R∪S ∪EV , then for all i ∈ [d∗G] let the
preference lists of aix(y1, y2) and b
i
x(y1, y2) be a
i
x(y1, y2)  x and aix(y1, y2), respectively, and add all
d∗G auxiliary agents a
i
x(y1, y2) between agents y1 and y2 in the preference list of x. In total, we have
|A| = |B| = d∗G ·
(∑n
i=1(|E(vi)|+ k) + n · (n− k) +m+ (n− k) · (n− 1) + k · (n− 1) + 2 · 2m
)
=
d∗G · (2n2 − n+ 7m).
Type-two auxiliary agents C ∪ D. To enforce that every matching within egalitarian
cost poly2(η) ·η must be perfect, we introduce type-two auxiliary agents and append them to the
preference list of each non-auxiliary agent and each type-one auxiliary agent. Formally, for each
agent x ∈ V ∪ T ∪ E ∪ F ∪ A ∪W ∪ S ∪ R ∪ EV ∪ B, we introduce η∗ auxiliary agents Cx := {c1x,
. . . , cη
∗
x } and add them to C, and η∗ auxiliary agents Dx{d1x, . . . , dη
∗
x } and add them to D; recall that
η∗ = poly2(η)·η+2. The preference lists of these agents are as follows: (i) If x ∈ V ∪T∪E∪F∪A, then
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for all i ∈ [η∗] let the preference lists of cix and dix be dix  [Dx\{dix}] and cix  [Cx\{cix}]  x, respec-
tively, and append all η∗ auxiliary agents dix to the end of the preference list of x. (ii) Otherwise, that
is, x ∈W∪S∪R∪EV ∪B, then for all i ∈ [η∗] let the preference lists of cix and dix be dix  [Dx\{dix}] 
x and cix  [Cx\{cix}], respectively, and append all η∗ auxiliary agents cix to the end of the preference
list of x. In total, we have |C| = |D| = η∗ · (|V |+ |T |+ |E|+ |F |+ |A|+ |W |+ |R|+ |S|+ |EV |+ |B|).
Observe that every matching with egalitarian cost at most poly2(η)·η must assign to every type-two
auxiliary agent a partner that is also of type two, as otherwise the egalitarian cost induced by such
two agents would be at least η∗ − 1 = poly2(η)·η + 1 > poly2(η)·η.
This completes the construction of the profile P . Clearly, it can be constructed in polyno-
mial time.
Correctness of the construction. In the following, we show that the existence of any polynomial-
time poly1-factor approximation algorithm for Global-Near+Perf or Local-Near+Perf or
any polynomial-time (poly1, poly2)-factor approximation algorithm for Global-Near+Egal or
Local-Near+Egal implies P = NP. More precisely, we claim the following.
Claim 2. (1) If G admits a k-vertex independent set, then P admits a globally dG-nearly stable
and perfect matching, which is also locally dL-nearly stable and has egalitarian cost at most η.
(2) If P admits a globally poly1(dG)·dG-nearly stable and perfect matching, then G admits a
k-vertex independent set.
(3) If P admits a locally poly1(dL)·dL-nearly stable and perfect matching, then G admits a k-vertex
independent set.
Proof. To show the first statement, assume that V ? ⊆ V is a k-vertex independent set of G.
Construct a perfect matching M for P as follows. Let i1 < i2 < . . . < ik be the indices of the
vertices in V ?, that is, for each z ∈ [k] we have viz ∈ V ?. Similarly, let j1 < j2 < . . . < jn−k be the
indices of the vertices in V \ V ?. Matching M contains the following pairs.
(i) For each z ∈ [k], match {viz , sz} ∈M and {tiz , wiz} ∈M .
By the construction of the preference lists, the egalitarian cost of the pair {viz , sz} is at most
(d∗G + 1) · (n + k + k); recall that, for each agent x who is not an auxiliary agent and who is
not in W ∪E, we have placed exactly (d∗G + 1) type-one auxiliary agents between each pair of
non-auxiliary agents in x’s preference list. The egalitarian cost of the pair {tiz , wiz} is one. In
total, these 2 ·k pairs contribute at most k+(d∗G+1) ·(n+2 ·k) ·k units to the egalitarian cost.
(ii) For each z ∈ [n− k], match {vjz , wjz} ∈M and {tjz , rz} ∈M .
The egalitarian cost of the pair {vjz , wjz} is zero, while the egalitarian cost of the
pair {tjz , rz} is at most (d∗G + 1) · (n − k + n). In total, these 2 · (n − k) pairs contribute at
most (d∗G + 1) · (n− k + n) · (n− k) units to the egalitarian cost.
(iii) Further, for each edge e` ∈ E(G), choose an endpoint from e` ∩ V ? or an arbitrary
endpoint of e` if e` ∩ V ? = ∅. Say we have picked an endpoint with index i. Then, match
{e`, evi` }, {f`, e
vj
` } ∈M , where j is the index of the other endpoint of e`, different from i.
The egalitarian cost of these two pairs is at most (d∗G + 1) · 3.
(iv) Finally, for each type-one auxiliary agent azx(y1, y2) ∈ A, match her with its counter-part
from B, that is, match {azx(y1, y2), bzx(y1, y2)} ∈M . For each type-two auxiliary agent czx ∈ C,
match it with its counter-part from D, that is, match her {czx, dzx} ∈M .
There is no egalitarian cost for these pairs.
This concludes the definition of M , which is clearly a perfect matching. One can verify that the
egalitarian cost of M is at most k + (d∗G + 1) ·
(
(n+ 2 · k) · k + (2n− k) · (n− k) + 3m) = η
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It remains to show that M is globally dG-nearly stable and locally dL-nearly stable. We claim
that after performing the following swaps, indeed, M is stable: For each edge agent e` ∈ E let evi`
and e
vj
` be the two vertex agents in its preference lists with i < j, if M(e`) = e
vj
` , then swap the
order of these two agents evi` and e
vj
` in e`’s preference list; recall that there are no other agents
between these two agents. For each agent wi which is not matched to vi, swap vi with ti in wi’s
preference list; note that there are exactly k such agents. Clearly, each agent has performed at
most 1 = dL swap and the total number of performed swaps is at most m+ k ≤ dG. Denote by P ′
the profile that results from these swaps.
Next, we show that M is stable for P ′. Clearly, each auxiliary agent receives its most
preferred agent, and, hence, no auxiliary agent can be involved in a blocking pair. Similarly, each
agent wi ∈ W receives its most preferred agent (after the k swaps performed on W ), and, hence,
no agent from W can be involved in a blocking pair. Since each edge agent e` is matched to its
most preferred agent, no blocking pair can involve any edge agent e`. Since the partner M(e`)
of each edge agent e` already obtains its most preferred agent, no blocking pair can involve any
agent M(e`). Further, since these agents, M(e`), are the only agents which may be preferred by
any agent f` to M(f`), no blocking pair can involve any f`; recall that we have just reasoned
that no auxiliary agent is involved in a blocking pair. Furthermore, each vertex agent vi whose
corresponding vertex does not belong to the independent set, i.e. vi ∈ V \ V ? is matched to its
most preferred agent. Similarly, each agent tz with M(tz) = wz cannot be involved in a blocking
pair because she already obtains its most preferred agent.
A potential blocking pair must hence involve an agent from {tjz | vjz ∈ V \ V ?} ∪ V ?.
Consider an agent tjz with vjz ∈ V \ V ?. By the construction of matching M , it follows that
M(tjz) = rz. Since neither wjz nor any auxiliary agent can be involved in a blocking pair, by the
preference list of tjz it follows that tjz could only form a blocking pair with an agent rz′ such that
z < z′. However, this agent rz′ prefers its partner M(rz′) = tjz′ to tjz . Hence, no agent tjz can be
involved in a blocking pair.
Consider an agent viz which corresponds to a vertex from the independent set V
?. By the con-
struction of matching M , it follows that M(viz) = sz. By our reasoning above, wiz will not form a
blocking pair with viz as it already obtains its most preferred partner. Agent viz prefers agent sz′ to
its partner sz only if z
′ < z. However, for each z′ < z, agent sz′ prefers its partner M(sz′) = viz′ to
agent viz (recall that iz′ < iz). Thus, no agent from S will form with viz a blocking pair. Any block-
ing pair must thus be of the form {vi, evi` } where vi ∈ V ? and evi` ∈ E(vi). However, since vi ∈ V ?, for
each of its incident edges, say e`, we have matched e
vi
` to its most preferred agent e`. Thus, indeed,
there is no blocking pair, showing that M is globally dG-nearly stable and locally dL-nearly stable.
For the second statement of Claim 2, assume that M is a globally poly1(dG)·dG-nearly stable
and perfect matching for P and let P ′ be a profile that results from P by making at most
poly1(dG)·dG swaps such that M is stable in P ′.
Recall that for each agent y which is either non-auxiliary or an auxiliary agent of type one we
have introduced 2 ·η∗ type-two auxiliary agents, contained in Cy and in Dy. Observe that either Cy
or Dy finds only the agents from the other set acceptable. Hence, by the perfectness of M , the part-
ners of all agents from Cy are exactly the agents from Dy. Consequently, we can ignore all type-two
auxiliary agents in the preference lists of the remaining agents. In particular, for each pair of type-
one auxiliary agents azx(y1, y2) and b
z
x(y1, y2), one of them finds only the other agent acceptable (ig-
noring the type-two auxiliary agents). Again, by the perfectness of M , we infer that each azx(y1, y2)
is matched to its counter-part bzx(y1, y2). Hence, from now on, when discussing the partners of a
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non-auxiliary agent, we only need to consider the non-auxiliary agents in its preference list.
Recall that there are at least d∗G type-one auxiliary agents between each non-auxiliary
agents in the preference list of each agent from V ∪ R ∪ S ∪ T ∪ Ev ∪ F . By the fact that
d∗G = poly1(dG)·dG+poly1(dL)·dL+1, it is impossible to perform poly1(dG)·dG swaps so as to switch
the positions of two non-auxiliary agents in the preference list of an agent from V ∪R∪S∪T∪EV ∪F .
Thus, the only swaps performed to obtain P ′ are without loss of generality in the preference lists
of agents in E ∪W and are only within the non-auxiliary agents.
Let V ′ = {vi ∈ V (G) | M(vi) ∈ S}. We claim that V ′ is a k-vertex independent set in G.
First, V ′ has cardinality k because M is perfect and the only remaining acceptable partners to
every agent in S are those in V . Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that V ′ contains two
adjacent vertices vi and vj and let e` = {vi, vj} be their incident edge. By the definition of V ′, it
follows that both vi and vj are assigned partners from S. Since vi prefers e
vi
` to every agent from S
and since evi` prefers only e` to vi, by the stability of M in P
′, it follows that M(evi` ) = e`; recall that
no swaps are performed in between any two non-auxiliary agents in the preference lists of the agents
from V ∪EV . Analogously, it must hold that M(evj` ) = e`—a contradiction to M being a matching.
The reasoning for the third statement is analogous to what we have done for the second
statement. Instead of arguing about the total number of swaps, we only need to argue that the
number of swaps changed per agent is poly1(dL)·dL which is strictly smaller than by d∗G. Thus, it
is still impossible to change the positions of two non-auxiliary agents in any the preference list of
any non-auxiliary agent from V ∪R ∪ S ∪ T ∪ Ev ∪ F . (of Claim 2) 
The next claim establishes a close connection between the egalitarian cost and the perfectness
of a matching.
Claim 3. If M is a matching with egalitarian cost of at most poly2(η)·η, then this matching must
be perfect.
Proof. Assume that M has egalitarian cost at most poly2(η) ·η. It is straight-forward to see that
this M must be perfect as otherwise the cost of leaving one agent unmatched is equal to the length
of this agent’s preference list, exceeding the budget poly2(η)·η because the length of each agent’s
preference list is at least η∗ > poly2(η)·η + 1. (of Claim 3) 
Now, we continue with our correctness proof.
Inapproximability of Global-Near+Perf. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there
exists a poly1-approximation algorithm A for Global-Near+Perf, running in polynomial-time.
Then, we can use algorithm A to decide Independent Set in polynomial time, showing P = NP.
Given an arbitrary instance I = (G, k) of Independent Set, we construct profile P and define
dG as described above and let A run on (P, dG). If I is a yes-instance, then by the first implication
of Claim 2, it follows that P admits a globally dG-nearly stable and perfect matching, and by
Definition 5.1, A return “yes”. If I is a no-instance, then by the contrapositive of the second
implication of Claim 2, it follows that P does not admit a globally poly1(dG)·dG-nearly stable and
perfect matching. By Definition 5.1, A returns “no”.
Inapproximability of Global-Near+Egal. Again, suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
that there exists a (poly1, poly2)-approximation algorithm A for Global-Near+Egal, running
in polynomial-time. Then, we can use algorithm A to decide Independent Set in polynomial
time, showing P = NP, as follows. Given an arbitrary instance I = (G, k) of Independent Set,
we construct profile P and define dG, dL, and η as described above and let A run on (P, dG, η).
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If I is a yes-instance, then by the first implication of Claim 2 it follows that P admits a globally
dG-nearly stable matching with egalitarian cost at most η, and by Definition 5.2, A return “yes”.
If I is a no-instance, then by the contrapositive of the second implication of Claim 2 it follows
that P does not admit a globally poly1(dG)·dG-nearly stable perfect matching. This implies that
P does not admit a globally poly1(dG)·dG-nearly stable matching with egalitarian cost at most
poly2(η)·η as otherwise, by Claim 3, we will have a globally poly1(dG)·dG-nearly stable and perfect
matching for P—a contradiction. By Definition 5.2, A returns “no”.
Inapproximability of Local-Near+Perf. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there
exists a poly1-approximation algorithm A for Local-Near+Perf, running in polynomial-time.
Then, we can use algorithm A to decide Independent Set in polynomial time, showing P = NP,
as follows. Given an arbitrary instance I = (G, k) of Independent Set, we construct profile P
and define dG, dL, and η as described above and let A run on (P, dL). If I is a yes-instance, then
by the first implication of Claim 2, P also admits a locally dL-nearly stable and perfect matching.
Thus, by Definition 5.1, A return “yes”. If I is a no-instance, then by the contrapositive of the
third implication from Claim 2, P does not admit a locally poly1(dL)·dL-nearly stable perfect
matching. By Definition 5.1, A returns “no”.
Inapproximability of Local-Near+Egal. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there
exists a (poly1, poly2)-approximation algorithm A for Local-Near+Egal, running in polynomial-
time. Then, we can use algorithm A to decide Independent Set in polynomial time, showing P =
NP as follows. Given an arbitrary instance I = (G, k) of Independent Set, we construct profile P
and define dG, dL, and η as described above and let A run on (P, dL, η). If I is a yes-instance, then
by the first implication of Claim 2 it follows that P admits a locally dL-nearly stable matching with
egalitarian cost at most η, and by Definition 5.2, A return “yes”. If I is a no-instance, then by the
contrapositive of the third implication from Claim 2, P does not admit a locally poly1(dL)·dL-nearly
stable perfect matching. By the contrapositive of Claim 3, P does not admit a locally poly1(dL)·dL-
nearly stable matching with egalitarian cost at most η. By Definition 5.2, A returns “no”.
5.2 Parameterized Complexity
We now investigate the influence of three natural parameters on the complexity of obtaining nearly
stable matchings: “total number dG of swaps”, “number nu of initially unmatched agents”, and
“number nm of initially matched agents”; the latter two will be defined below. Note that Theo-
rem 5.3 implies that even only one swap leaves the problems pertaining to locally nearly stable
matchings NP-hard. This is different from the globally nearly stable variants, for which simple
polynomial-time algorithms for a constant number of swaps exist. However, we show that remov-
ing the dependence on the number of swaps in the exponent in the running time is impossible unless
FPT = W[1].
Proposition 5.4. Global-Near+Perf and Global-Near+Egal are solvable in nO(dG) time.
Proof sketch. Iterate over all
(
n2
dG
)
possibilities for making dG swaps and check for each of the
resulting profiles using the well-known polynomial-time algorithms [15, 20] whether it admits a
stable matching which is perfect, or satisfies the required bound on the egalitarian cost.
A substantial improvement on the above rather trivial nO(dG)-time algorithm would imply a
major breakthrough, as the following theorem shows.
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Theorem 5.5. Global-Near+Perf and Global-Near+Egal are W[1]-hard with respect to
the number dG of swaps. Moreover, they both do not admit any n
o(dG)-time algorithm unless the
Exponential Time Hypothesis fails.
Proof. We first show that Global-Near+Perf is W[1]-hard for dG and refutes n
o(dG)-running
time algorithms. Then, we show how to adapt the proof to show an analogous result for Global-
Near+Egal. To show the results for Global-Near+Perf, we provide a polynomial-time reduc-
tion from the W[1]-complete Independent Set problem, parameterized by the solution size k [10],
and set the parameter to dG = 2k. Let (G, k) be an instance of Independent Set where we seek
for an independent set of size k in the n-vertex, m-edge graph G, with V (G) = {v1, . . . , vn} and
E(G) = {e1, . . . , em}. We construct a preference profile P with two disjoint sets of agents, A and
B, each consisting of five groups and a dummy agent: A := T ∪ V ∪ W ∪ E ∪ EY ∪ {h1} and
B := S ∪X ∪ Y ∪ F ∪ FV ∪ {h2}. Note that we use the symbols vi (resp. e`) for both vertices and
agents (resp. for both edges and agents). It will, however, be clear from the context what we are
referring to when we use them. The two dummy agents h1 and h2 are used to make performing
some swaps non-beneficial.
Agent sets T and S. For each z ∈ [k], introduce two selection agents tz and sz add them to T
and S, respectively. These agents will be unmatched in every stable matching of P and matching
them will force a selection of k vertices from G into an independent set. Their acceptable agents
are a subset of the vertex agents that we introduce as follows.
Agent sets V , W , X, and Y . For each vertex vi ∈ V (G), introduce four agents vi, wi, xi, and
yi, and add them to the sets V , W , X, and Y , respectively. For each i ∈ [n], these agents will
form a path vi, xi, wi, yi in the acceptability graph. The basic idea is that, in the initial profile,
every stable matching must match agent vi to agent xi and agent wi to yi. As we will see, such
matchings are imperfect since the agents from S are unmatched in every stable matching. To obtain
a perfect matching, we must match some selection agent sz ∈ S to some vertex agent vi, selecting
the corresponding vertex vi into a solution for the input graph. This will incur two swaps to make
the resulting matching stable. Below, we introduce edge agents and add them to the preference
lists of agents vi and yi, in order to ensure that the selected vertices induce an independent set.
Agent sets E, EY , F , and FV . For each edge e` ∈ E(G), denote the endpoints of e` by vi and
vj such that i < j. Introduce four edge agents e`, e
yj
` , f`, and f
vi
` , and add them to E, EY , F , and
FV , respectively.
The preference lists of the agents are constructed as follows. Here, for some set Z, the nota-
tion [Z] means an arbitrary but fixed linear order of Z.
Preference lists of the agents.
h1 : h2  [Y ], h2 : h1  [V ],
∀z ∈ [k],
tz : y1  . . . yn, sz : v1  . . . vn.
∀i ∈ [n],
vi : xi  h2  [{fvi` |e`={vi, vj}∈E(G) with i<j}]  s1  . . . sk,
wi : yi  xi, xi : vi  wi,
yi : wi  h1  [{eyi` |e`={vr, vi}∈E(G) with r<i}]  t1  . . . tk,
∀` ∈ [m] with e` = {vi, vj} and i < j,
e` : f
vi
`  f`, f` : e`  e
yj
` ,
e
yj
` : f`  yj  fvi` , fvi` : e
yj
`  vi  e`.
39
yi
wi
xi
vi
yj
wj
xj
vjfvi` e
yj
`
e` f`
0
0 1
1
0
0
0
0 1
1
0
0
≥2 1 2
0
0 2
1 0
1
0
1 ≥2
tz
≥ 2
i−1
≥ 2
j−1
sz′
≥ 2
i−1
≥ 2
j−1
Figure 2: Part of the acceptability graph of the profile constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.5.
Agent sets T and S. These agents will be unmatched in every stable matching of P and matching
them will force a selection of k vertices from G into an independent set. Their acceptable agents
are a subset of the vertex agents that we introduce as follows.
Agent sets V , W , X, and Y . For each vertex vi ∈ V (G), introduce four agents vi, wi, xi, and
yi, and add them to the sets V , W , X, and Y , respectively. For each i ∈ [n], these agents will
form a path vi, xi, wi, yi in the acceptability graph. The basic idea is that, in the initial profile,
every stable matching must match agent vi to agent xi and agent wi to yi. As we will see, such
matchings are imperfect since the agents from S are unmatched in every stable matching. To obtain
a perfect matching, we must match some selection agent sz ∈ S to some vertex agent vi, selecting
the corresponding vertex vi into a solution for the input graph. This will incur two swaps to make
the resulting matching stable. Below, we introduce edge agents and add them to the preference
lists of agents vi and yi, in order to ensure that the selected vertices induce an independent set.
Figure 2 depicts the crucial part of the induced acceptability graph for an edge e` = {vi, vj} ∈ E(G)
with i < j. The weights at both sides of the edges denote the ranks of the respective endpoint
towards the other endpoint.
To complete the construction, define the total number of swap as dG = 2k. Clearly, the construc-
tion can be done in polynomial time. Now observe that every stable matching from the constructed
profile does not match exactly 2k agents, namely those from T ∪ S.
To show that our construction is indeed a parameterized reduction it remains to show that G
admits a k-vertex independent set if and only if there exists a preference profile P ′ with τ(P, P ′) ≤
d = 2k which admits a perfect stable matching M .
For the “only if” part, assume that there exists a k-vertex independent set V ′ ⊆ V in G. We
define the preference profile P ′ by performing the following dG = 2k swaps which involve the agents
from W ∪ X that correspond to the vertices from the independent set. For each z ∈ [k], swap
the two agents yi and xi in the preference list of agent wi, and swap the agents vi and wi in the
preference list of agent xi.
Now, we construct the following perfect matching M for P ′. Let V ′ = {vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vik}, where
i1 < i2 < . . . < ik.
1. Put {h1, h2} ∈M .
2. For each z ∈ [k], put {viz , sz}, {wiz , xiz}, {tz, yiz} ∈M .
3. For each i ∈ [n] \ {i1, i2, . . . , ik}, put {vi, xi}, {wi, yi} ∈M .
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4. For each edge e` ∈ E(G), let vi and vj be the two endpoints of edge e` with i < j, and do
the following. Recall that we have created two agents with the names fvi` and e
vj
` . If vi ∈ V ′
belongs to the independent set, implying that vj ∈ V \ V ′, then put {e`, f`}, {eyi` , f
vj
` } ∈ M .
Otherwise, that is, if vi /∈ V ′, then put {e`, fvi` }, {e
yj
` , f`} ∈M .
Clearly, M is perfect. We claim that M is also stable for P ′.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that p is a blocking pair of M for the profile P ′. First,
observe that p cannot involve h1, h2, wi, or xi for any i ∈ [n] as these agents already obtain their
most preferred agents in P ′. For the same reason, p cannot involve any agent vi for some i ∈
[n] \ {i1, i2, . . . , ik}. Further, p cannot involve an agent sz or an agent tz for any z ∈ [k] because
of the following. For each agent c such that agent sz prefers c to M(sz) = viz we have that c
equals either some agent vi with i ∈ [n] \ {i1, i2, . . . , ik}, which already obtains her most preferred
partner M(vi) = xi, or c equals some agent vir with r < z, which prefers her partner M(vir) = sir
to agent siz . Using a similar reasoning, we thus obtain that p can neither involve an agent tz,
z ∈ [k]. Moreover, p cannot involve two edge agents which correspond to two different edges or one
vertex agent and one edge agent such that the corresponding vertex and edge are not incident to
each other. Combining all of the above observations, we infer that p either (a) involves two edge
agents which correspond to the same edge or (b) a vertex agent and an edge agent such that the
corresponding vertex and edge are not incident to each other.
For Case (a), observe that in each pair of mutually acceptable edge agents that correspond to
the same edge, one receives its most-preferred partner in M with respect to P ′. Hence, Case (b)
must hold.
Let e` be the edge corresponding to the edge agent involved in p and let vi and vj be the two
endpoints of edge e` with i < j. Thus, p = {eyj` , yj} or p = {vi, fvi` }.
If p = {eyj` , yj}, by the definition of blocking pairs, it follows that M(e
yj
` ) = f
vi
` and M(yj) = tz
for some z ∈ [k]. However, by the definition of M , from M(yj) = tz we infer that vj ∈ V ′ and from
M(e
yj
` ) = f
vi
` we infer vj ∈ V \ V ′, a contradiction.
Analogously, if p = {vi, fvi` }, by the definition of blocking pairs, it follows that M(vi) = sz for
some z ∈ [k] and that M(fvi` ) = e`. However, by our definition of M , from M(vi) = sz we infer
vi ∈ V ′ and from M(fvi` ) = e` we infer vi ∈ V \ V ′, a contradiction.
Hence, indeed, M is stable in P ′.
For the “if” part, assume that there exists a perfect matching M for profile P and there exists
a preference profile P ′ with τ(P, P ′) ≤ d = 2k such that M is stable for P ′. By the perfectness of
M there are i1, . . . , ik ∈ [n] such that for each z ∈ [k] we have that M(viz) ∈ S. We show that the
vertex subset V ′ := {vi1 , . . . , vik} is a k-vertex independent set in G.
First of all, we claim the following.
Claim 4. For each agent vi ∈ V it holds that M(vi) ∈ S if and only if M(yi) ∈ T . Moreover, no
agent in V ∪ Y ∪ EY ∪ FV changes her preference list in P ′.
Proof. We define two subsets I1 := {i ∈ [n] |M(vi) ∈ S} and I2 := {i′ ∈ [n] |M(yi′) ∈ T}. To show
the first statement, it suffices to show that I1 = I2. Clearly, |I1| = |I2| = k because |S| = |T | = k
and M is a perfect matching.
If we can show that for each i ∈ I1∪ I2 there are exactly two distinct swaps in P ′ in comparison
to P , exactly one swap in xi’s preference list and exactly one swap in wi’s preference list, then by
the swap budget dG = 2k and by the cardinalities of I1 and I2, it follows that I1 = I2.
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Now, consider an index i ∈ I1; the case when i ∈ I2 is symmetric and omitted. By our definition
of I1, we have that M(vi) ∈ S. Since M is perfect, it follows that {xi, wi} ∈ M . Since xi and vi
are each other’s most preferred agent in profile P , at least one swap occurs in the preference lists
of xi and vi to make M stable for P
′; otherwise they would form a blocking pair. Similarly, since
wi and yi are each other’s most preferred agent in P
′, at least one swap occurs in the preference
lists of wi or yi to make M stable for P
′. Since |I1| = k, meaning that there are at least k distinct
agents in V matched to agents in S, the preference lists of xi and vi are affected indeed by exactly
one swap (otherwise there would be more than 2k swaps in total). Analogously, exactly one swap
occurs in the preference lists of wi and yi. By our swap budget, it follows that only agents in
V ∪ X ∪W ∪ Y may have a different preference list in P ′ compared to P . This, in particular,
implies that M(h1) = M(h2) as otherwise we need at least one more swap to make M stable in P
′.
Observe that at least one agent, namely h2, is between vi’s partner M(vi) ∈ S and xi. Thus,
it takes more than one swap to make M stable in P ′ if we change the preference list of vi and not
the preference list of xi. Analogously, at least one agent, namely h1, is between yi’s partner M(yi)
and wi; recall that we have just reasoned that M(h1) = h2. Thus, it also takes more than one swap
to make M stable in P ′ if we change the preference list of yi and not that of wi Summarizing, to
make M stable for P ′, there is exactly one swap in the preference list of xi and there is exactly one
swap in the preference list of wi.
The second statement follows directly from our swap budget and from the above reasoning that
for each i ∈ I1, there is exactly one swap in the preference list of xi and there is exactly one swap
in the preference list of wi that are performed for P to obtain P
′. (of Claim 4) 
To show that V ′ is indeed an independent set, suppose, towards a contradiction, that V ′ contain
two adjacent vertices vi and vj with i < j. Let e` = {vi, vj} be the incident edge.
By the first statement in Claim 4, it follows that M(yj) ∈ T .
By the second statement in Claim 4, agent vi does not change her preference list in P
′, meaning
that agent vi prefers f
vi
` to her partner M(vi) ∈ S in P ′. By the stability of M , it follows that fvi`
prefers her partner M(fvi` ) to vi. Again, by the second statement in Claim 4, agent f
vi
` does not
change her preference list in P ′, meaning that fvi` prefers only e
yj
` to vi. By the stability of M , we
have M(fvi` ) = e
yj
` . This implies that {e
yj
` , yj} is a blocking pair, because M(yj) ∈ T by the above
and by the second statement of Claim 4. This is a contradiction. Thus, indeed I ′ is a k-vertex
independent set. The correctness follows.
The fact that an no(dG)-time algorithm for Global-Near+Perf would contradict the Expo-
nential Time Hypothesis follows from this reduction in conjunction with the fact that an no(k)-time
algorithm for Independent Set would contradict the Exponential Time Hypothesis [10].
The egalitarian case. To show the desired statements for the egalitarian case, we use the
same idea of constructing type-two auxiliary agents in the proof of Theorem 5.3: We append a
sufficiently large number ∆ (to be specified later) of auxiliary agents to the end of each preference
list which we constructed for the perfectness case such that the following conditions are satisfied.
First, it is possible to match all auxiliary agents in pairs without inducing any egalitarian cost.
Second, the matching M constructed from an independent set as above has egalitarian cost at
most ∆ − 1. Third, every globally dG-nearly stable matching within egalitarian cost at most
∆ − 1 must be perfect. As mentioned, this can be done using the same construction as for the
type-two auxiliary agents in Theorem 5.3, adjusting the number of agents such that we add ∆ :=
(2k+ 1) · (|T |+ |V |+ |W |+ |E|+ |EY |+ 1) + 2k = (2k+ 1) · (3n+ 2m+ 1) + 2k agents to the end of
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each preference list. The correctness follows in an analogous way as we prove Claim 2(1)–(2) and
Claim 3.
By Proposition 2.3, the set of unmatched agents is the same across all stable matchings of
a given preference profile P . We call an agent initially unmatched if she is not contained in any
stable matching of the initial profile; otherwise she is initially matched. From Theorem 2.6 it follows
that, in order to assign partners to the nu initially unmatched agents, we need to allow for at least
dG ≥ nu/2 swaps in Global-Near+Perf. The number nu is thus a smaller parameter than dG,
meaning that it could be harder to obtain parameterized tractability result with respect to nu than
to dG. Indeed, we obtain intractability for nu.
Corollary 5.6. Global-Near+Perf and Global-Near+Egal are W[1]-hard with respect to
the number of initially unmatched nu agents. This also holds for Local-Near+Perf and Local-
Near+Egal, even if dL = 1.
Proof. The reduction in the proof of Theorem 5.3 indeed is a parameterized reduction with respect
to the number of unmatched agents which shows W[1]-hardness: First, observe that the reduction
runs in polynomial time. Second, Independent Set is W[1]-hard with respect to the number k
of vertices in the sought independent set. Third, the number of unmatched agents in any stable
matching of the initial profile P constructed by the reduction is at most 2k. To see this, observe
the following. Let M be a stable matching for P . For each vertex agent vi ∈ V , it must hold that
{vi, wi} ∈ M , since this pair would otherwise block M . Thus, for each edge e` = {vi, vj} ∈ E(G),
the edge agent e` is matched by M to either e
vi
` or e
vj
` , and f` is matched to {evi` , e
vj
` } \ {M(e`)}.
Furthermore, for each z ∈ [n− k], agent tz ∈ T is matched to agent rz ∈ R, saturating R. Hence,
the only unmatched agents are the k agents in {tn−k+1, . . . , tn} and the k agents in S.
On a side note, it is not hard to obtain a fixed-parameter algorithm for Global-Near+Perf
with respect to the number nm of initially matched agents, that is, the number of agents that occur
in every stable matching of the initial profile.
Proposition 5.7. Global-Near+Perf can be solved in O(nm
nm2·log (nm) · n2) time and admits a
problem kernel with 2nm agents that can be computed in linear time.
Proof Sketch. Let P be a preference profile with agents sets U and W of size n each. Further let
n1 (resp. n2) denote the number of agents from U that are initially matched (resp. unmatched)
under any stable matching of P . Analogously, we define n3 and n4 for the set W , i.e. n3 (resp.
n4) denotes the number of from W that are initially matched (resp. unmatched) under any stable
matching of P . By the definition of matching, it follows that
n1 = n3 and n2 = n4.
Hence, together with the definition of nm and nu, it follows that
n1 + n3 = 2n1 = 2n3 = nm and n2 + n4 = 2n2 = 2n4 = nu. (8)
Observe that no two initially unmatched agents are acceptable to each other since, if they were, then
they would form a blocking pair. Thus, in each matching that represents a solution to Global-
Near+Perf, each initially unmatched agent from U (resp. W ) is partnered with an initially
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matched agent from W (resp. U). Thus, if n2 > n3 or n4 > n1, we can immediately return no (or
a trivial no-instance). By (8), we obtain that
|U | = n1 + n2 ≤ n1 + n3 = nm and |W | = n3 + n4 ≤ n3 + n1 = nm. (9)
In other words, we obtain a problem kernel with at most 2nm agents. This takes O(n
2) time.
To solve Global-Near+Perf in O(2nm
2·log(nm) ·n2) time, observe that by (9) each agent from
U ∪W has at most nm agents in her preference list, and there are 2nm agents from U ∪W . We
hence iterate through all (nm!)
2nm target profile P ′ which differs from P by at most dG swaps. For
each of these preference profiles, we check in O(n2) time whether it admits a stable and perfect
matching.
We conclude this section by remarking that the kernelization approach for Proposition 5.7
cannot be directly adapted to work for the egalitarian case because not every initially unmatched
agent needs to be matched in an optimal egalitarian stable matching.
6 Conclusion and Open Questions
In this paper we have introduced and studied a framework describing the strength of the stability
of matchings under preferences. Our framework unifies and extends some of the few approaches
that already exist in the literature, such as additive α-stability [32, 1], r-maximal stability [12],
and robustness to the errors in inputs [23, 24]. We have elaborated that all these approaches can
be expressed by the same model, where the central idea is to investigate the preference profiles
which have bounded distance to the input profile. Thus, we open up a general framework to study
questions that have already received attention in the literature.
From a computational point of view, we have shown a somehow counter-intuitive relation be-
tween strength of stability, and other criteria of social optimality. On the one hand, there exists
a polynomial-time algorithm for finding robust matchings if they exist (recall that robustness is a
stronger concept than classic stability) even if we additionally aim to reach social optimality. On
the other hand, if we ask about near stability instead of robustness, the problem becomes com-
putationally hard in many aspects: it is hard to approximate and hard from the point of view of
parameterized complexity. Our computational results are summarized in Table 1.
We conclude with some challenges for future research. First of all, for the case where no d-robust
matchings exist, we may look for a matching that admits the fewest number of blocking pairs [3, 8]
in every profile that has swap distance d to the input profile.
Second, continuing our research in Section 4 where we showed that Robust Matching becomes
NP-hard when ties are allowed, our near stability concept can be generalized to the case with ties.
Moreover, both robustness and near stability, though introduced for the bipartite variant (Stable
Marriage), can be generalized to the non-bipartite variant (Stable Roommates). It would be
interesting to see whether our algorithmic results transfer to these cases.
Regarding preference restrictions [5], it would be interesting to know whether assuming a special
preference structure can help in finding tractable cases for nearly stable matchings.
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